[EM] Symmetric ICT reformulation and exploration

[Michael Ossipoff]

But, if that will elect the CWs, with sincere voting, then isn't there
still an incentive and vulnerability for some faction to falsify
preferences to make a strategic cycle that they might win, if they don't
like the likely CWs?

Michael Ossipoff

On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 3:10 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:

> Combining Candidate Withdrawal with Candidate Transfer:
>
> When a candidate withdraws, hir votes are distributed in accordance with
> the additional preferences of hir supporters.  When no additional
> preferences are specified, it is assumed that the voter supports the
> preference order of the withdrawing candidate.
>
> Voters may place NOTB (none of the below) above their truncated
> candidates.  If at any stage the NOTB candidate accumulates more than
> two-thirds (say) of the votes, the election is scuttled and new candidates
> must be nominated.
>
> On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 9:55 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> But, even if that rule were extended to rescue a CWv that's farther down
>> in the rankings  I guess that would just be like having a rule to elect the
>> CWv if there is one, and otherwise to do IRV, which would be a less-good
>> relative of Benham & Woodall.
>>
>> And of course a rule to elect  the CWv is always vulnerable to strategic
>> falsification of preferences to make a strategic cycle, with the problems
>> that go with that.
>>
>> In fact, I guess that the candidate-withdrawal option, Steve Eppley's
>> original proposal, would, as well, be vulnerable to a faction making a
>> strategic cycle, to avoid a result in which the election of the CWv is
>> inevitable due to the candidate-withdrawal that will happen if ordinary IRV
>> doesn't elect the CWv..
>>
>> Oh well, so much for that possibility :^)
>>
>> Michael Ossipoff
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 10:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff <
>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Speaking of candidate-participation methods, Steve Eppley proposed the
>>> simplest one: the Candidate Withdrawal option.
>>>
>>> When the count result is announced, any candidate has 24 hours in which
>>> to announce hir withdrawal from the election, and call for a re-count with
>>> hir deleted from the ballots.
>>>
>>> An IRVist objected to that, because withdrawal betrays the candidate's
>>> voters.  Ok, then add a rule that a winning candidate can't withdraw :^)
>>>
>>> The candidate withdrawal option would completely save IRV from its
>>> problem. Candidate-withdrawal should be offered as an amendment to IRV
>>> proposals, and also to already-enacted IRV.
>>>
>>> But, just looking at IRV, the circumstances for wanting to withdraw
>>> (Your voters let the CWv get eliminated, by ranking hir 2nd instead of 1st,
>>> and hir votes transferred the other way) seem so well-defined and specific
>>> as to suggested an automated candidate-withdrawal, built into the IRV
>>> count-rule.
>>>
>>> How about saying that, when that happens, the count rule will delete the
>>> 1st choice that is in the way of the eliminated CWv being at the top of the
>>> rankings that didn't help CWv because they ranked hir 2nd, and their vote
>>> never got to hir?   ...followed by a 2nd count without the deleted 1st
>>> choice?
>>>
>>> ...or it could be an option for the voter to choose if s/he wants that
>>> deletion and re-count to occur if hir 1st choice eliminates a CWv,
>>> resulting the election of someone over whom you ranked the CWv.   ...where,
>>> without that 1st choice, the CWv would have won.
>>>
>>> That option would only apply to the first election result, and not to
>>> subsequent ones.
>>>
>>> The method could be called "Automatic Strategic Dropping"
>>>
>>> Or, IRV with that option could be called "Auto-Revotable IRV".
>>>
>>> I don't like the name IRV. Its meaning isn't a good description. RCV is
>>> even worse, because _every_ rank-balloting method is RCV.
>>>
>>> I'd like to rename IRV as "Delete Least Favorite", "Delete Least Top",
>>> "Eliminate Least Favorite" or "Eliminate Least Top".
>>>
>>> That would be DLF, DLT, ELF, or ELT.  How about ELF?
>>>
>>> That name goes with my brief definition of the IRV count:
>>>
>>> Repeatedly, delete from the rankings the candidate currently topping
>>> fewest rankings.
>>>
>>> [end of definition of ELF definition]
>>>
>>> If that action is repeated, it will eventually leave only one un-deleted
>>> candidate.
>>>
>>> So "Auto-Revotable Eliminate Least Favorite"?
>>>
>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 6:57 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Nov 12, 2016 at 9:29 PM, Michael Ossipoff <
>>>> email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Yes, it would make sense, and be interesting for a voting-system
>>>>> reform proposal to include CVT in its list of offered methods. Offer a
>>>>> complete variety, and let the initiative committee &/or the public choose.
>>>>> The addition of CVT would greatly broaden the variety. So the list could be:
>>>>>
>>>>> Approval
>>>>> Score
>>>>> Bucklin
>>>>> MDDTR
>>>>> CVT
>>>>>
>>>>> Actually, it might be best to include IRV, with a fair assessment of
>>>>> its advantages & disadvantages, so that people won't think that IRV is
>>>>> being prejudcially ignored, and so as to answer, in advance, any arguments
>>>>> from FairVote.
>>>>>
>>>>> Michael Ossipoff
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree, IRV should be included for the reasons you suggest.
>>>>
>>>> Also, I think that the inclusion of a NOTA (none of the above) option
>>>> on the ballot should be a part of the CTV suggestion:  If NOTA gets the
>>>> highest total it means that too few of the voters trust the competence and
>>>> integrity of their favorites to act as proxies for them.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20161115/e3f6e645/attachment-0001.htm>