[EM] FBC, center squeeze, and CD

[Michael Ossipoff]

(Replying farther down)

On Wed, Nov 9, 2016 at 10:07 PM, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> On 11/10/2016 11:48 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> But that doesn't change the fact that all of my examples of wv's CWs
> "protection" guarantees had the CWs preferred from both sides, and
> supported from one wing, the wing opposite the truncating or burying wing.
>
> That's the "wv-like strategy" that I've been referring to.
>
> ...even though wv has an additional anti-burial guarantee, or even though
> its anti-burial guarantee is stronger and more general.
>
>
> Mike,
>
> I'm not completely clear on the exact definition of this
> property/criterion that you think is worth giving up compliance with
> Mono-add-Plump
> and Plurality to have.
>
> Good question. When I previously said what I meant by "wv-like strategy",
I assumed that no one is indifferent between the CWs and any other
candidate.
...which means that the CWs has _lots_ of support from the preferrers of
other candidates.

In fact, I assumed, without explicitly saying so, that voters & candidates
were on a 1D spectrum, with 2 "wings" (sets of voters separated by the
CWs), and that the truncation (innocent or strategic) or burial all came
from one wing, so that one wing all unanimously ranked the CWs over the
other wing's candidates.

So the CWs has a preference majority against everyone, and has a voted
pairwise majority against all of the candidates of the strategizing wing.

I don't know how well that holds up with more dimensions, with Euclidean or
city block distance.

Maybe the mathematicians can help with that. Forest?

In the meantime, maybe I should just say that "wv-like strategy" is only
defined for 1D, with the above-stated assumptions as stipulations.



> Yes, in the standard chicken-dilemma example, MDDTR elects A, and that's a
> violation of the Plurality Criterion. Try to forgive MDDTR for electing the
> most favorite-popular candidate who isn't majority-beaten  :^)
>
>
> I'm afraid I find the justification "most favorite-popular candidate who
> isn't majority-beaten" to be quite oblique and arbitrary-sounding.
>

Majority is a familiar notion. Losing to another candidate by a majority is
a reasonable enough grounds for disqualification, if not everyone is.

Among the non-disqualified candidates, choosing the most favorite one
sounds too natural to be called "arbitrary".

And the rule to elect the most favorite candidate who doesn't have someone
else ranked over hir by a majority has uniquely many of the best
properties. ...practical properties that make voting easier & make
sincerity safer.



>
> "Majority-beaten" can go away if we add a few ballots that just plump for
> nobody, so big deal.
>

Fine. So then I recommend that, in an MDDT election: If your candidate is
particularly in danger of majority-disqualification, you should recruit as
many voters as possible to plump for no one.

...or wait...Better yet, tell them to rank the candidates you like (and
suggest that they should like too) over the ones you don't like.

But, whatever you do, get the vote out. Giving an incentive to get everyone
to vote--Is that a bad thing? We'd have a big turnout.

And then, when one of those people shows up to vote, are they just going to
say to to themselves, "He said that it would be in my best interest to come
here & plump for no one."? Would that be in their best interest? Or might
they realize that, having come to the polling place, it might be even
better to preferentially rank the candidates whom they like more.

So, by all means, get the vote out.

Michael Ossipoff




>
>
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