<div dir="ltr">(Replying farther down)<br><br><div><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Nov 9, 2016 at 10:07 PM, C.Benham <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:cbenham@adam.com.au" target="_blank">cbenham@adam.com.au</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
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<div class="m_7872677193537689502moz-cite-prefix"><span class="">On 11/10/2016 11:48 AM, Michael
Ossipoff wrote:<br>
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<blockquote type="cite">But that doesn't change the fact that all
of my examples of wv's CWs "protection" guarantees had the CWs
preferred from both sides, and supported from one wing, the wing
opposite the truncating or burying wing.<br>
<br>
That's the "wv-like strategy" that I've been referring to.<br>
<br>
...even though wv has an additional anti-burial guarantee, or
even though its anti-burial guarantee is stronger and more
general.</blockquote>
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Mike,<br>
<br>
I'm not completely clear on the exact definition of this
property/criterion that you think is worth giving up compliance
with Mono-add-Plump<br>
and Plurality to have.<span class=""><br>
<br></span></div></div></blockquote><div>Good question. When I previously said what I meant by "wv-like strategy", I assumed that no one is indifferent between the CWs and any other candidate.<br></div><div>...which means that the CWs has _lots_ of support from the preferrers of other candidates.<br><br></div><div>In fact, I assumed, without explicitly saying so, that voters & candidates were on a 1D spectrum, with 2 "wings" (sets of voters separated by the CWs), and that the truncation (innocent or strategic) or burial all came from one wing, so that one wing all unanimously ranked the CWs over the other wing's candidates.<br><br></div><div>So the CWs has a preference majority against everyone, and has a voted pairwise majority against all of the candidates of the strategizing wing.<br></div><div><br></div><div>I don't know how well that holds up with more dimensions, with Euclidean or city block distance.<br><br></div><div>Maybe the mathematicians can help with that. Forest?<br><br></div><div>In the meantime, maybe I should just say that "wv-like strategy" is only defined for 1D, with the above-stated assumptions as stipulations.<br><br></div><div> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"><div class="m_7872677193537689502moz-cite-prefix"><span class="">
<blockquote type="cite">Yes, in the standard chicken-dilemma
example, MDDTR elects A, and that's a violation of the Plurality
Criterion. Try to forgive MDDTR for electing the most
favorite-popular candidate who isn't majority-beaten :^)</blockquote>
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I'm afraid I find the justification "most favorite-popular
candidate who isn't majority-beaten" to be quite oblique and
arbitrary-sounding.<br></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Majority is a familiar notion. Losing to another candidate by a majority is a reasonable enough grounds for disqualification, if not everyone is.<br><br></div><div>Among the non-disqualified candidates, choosing the most favorite one sounds too natural to be called "arbitrary".<br><br></div><div>And the rule to elect the most favorite candidate who doesn't have someone else ranked over hir by a majority has uniquely many of the best properties. ...practical properties that make voting easier & make sincerity safer.<br><br> <br></div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"><div class="m_7872677193537689502moz-cite-prefix">
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"Majority-beaten" can go away if we add a few ballots that just
plump for nobody, so big deal. </div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Fine. So then I recommend that, in an MDDT election: If your candidate is particularly in danger of majority-disqualification, you should recruit as many voters as possible to plump for no one.<br></div><div><br></div><div>...or wait...Better yet, tell them to rank the candidates you like (and suggest that they should like too) over the ones you don't like.<br><br></div><div>But, whatever you do, get the vote out. Giving an incentive to get everyone to vote--Is that a bad thing? We'd have a big turnout. <br><br>And then, when one of those people shows up to vote, are they just going to say to to themselves, "He said that it would be in my best interest to come here & plump for no one."? Would that be in their best interest? Or might they realize that, having come to the polling place, it might be even better to preferentially rank the candidates whom they like more.<br><br></div><div>So, by all means, get the vote out.<br><br></div><div>Michael Ossipoff<br></div><div><br></div><div class="m_7872677193537689502moz-cite-prefix"> <br>
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