[EM] FBC, center squeeze, and CD

[Michael Ossipoff]

I've just found your posting, and this is just a brief preliminary comment:

I, and often others, have just been assuming that each faction votes
uniformly.  I haven't looked at all at what _percentage_ of the CWs's
voters would have to plump, to thwart and penalize burial.

But my preliminary answer is that at least those voters have _some_ way to
deter burial. The would-be buriers don't know what percentage will plump,
and uncertainty can deter.

Michael Ossipoff

On Tue, Nov 8, 2016 at 11:25 PM, C.Benham <cbenham at adam.com.au> wrote:

> On 11/9/2016 8:35 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
> (You wrote) :
>
> And it isn't clear to me that "wv-like strategy" is even something we
> should take if it was free.
>
> (endquote)
>
> In Benham, Woodall, ICT, & probably many or most pairwise-count methods,
> the CWs has no protection from burial, or even from innocent, non-strategic
> truncation.
>
> With wv-like strategy, truncation from one side can't take victory from
> the CWs & give it to the truncators' candidate.
>
> ...and plumping by the CWs's voters makes it impossible for burial to
> succeed. In fact, the mere threat of that plumping can deter burial.
>
>
> So to "protect"  some candidate  that some voters imagine is the sincere
> CW (when perhaps there is no sincere CW or some other candidate
> is the sincere CW) you want to have a "defensive truncation" strategy
> available* inside* a method with a very strong random-fill incentive?
>
> And you should add (and stress) that it needs plumping by *all  *of the
> "CWs voters to make it impossible for burial to succeed", and not ,say,
> merely 93% of them (with the other 7% sincerely fully ranking):
>
> 43: A
> 03: A>B
> 44: B>C  (sincere may be B or B>A)
> 10: C
>
> 100 ballots.  C>A 54-46,   A>B 46-44,  B>C 47-10.   Top Ratings A46 > B44
> > C10.   Approvals: C54 > A46 > B44.
>
> Here MDDTR  (like MDDTA and WV and Margins and MMPO and Jameson's latest
> "holy grail")  all elect the possibly burying voters' favourite, B.
>
> Viewing the ballots from the top, A is the strongest candidate (and
> possibly the sincere CW) and viewing the ballots from the bottom C is the
> strongest candidate.  And electing B is simply a very bad (and flagrant)
> failure of  Later-no-Help. And B is both pairwise beaten and positionally
> dominated by A.
>
> So I can't accept any method that in this scenario elects B.
>
> Chris Benham
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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