[EM] Holy grail: PAR with FBC?

[Michael Ossipoff]

When I hear that, it's certainly worth checking out.This is just a brief
preliminary reply/comment:

But MDDTR _fully_ avoids the chicken-dilemma problem in the chicken-dilemma
example, and, in the strongest way, avoids center-squeeze with its wv-like
strategy.

Michael Ossipoff




On Mon, Nov 7, 2016 at 9:27 AM, Jameson Quinn <jameson.quinn at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Here's a new system. It's like PAR, but meets FBC, and deals with center
> squeeze correctly in the few tricky cases where PAR doesn't. I'm
> considering using the PAR name for this system, and renaming the current
> PAR to something like "Old Par
> <http://sr3.wine-searcher.net/images/labels/29/06/grand-old-parr-12-year-old-blended-scotch-whisky-scotland-10152906t.jpg>".
> Meanwhile, the system below is temporarily called PARFBC
> <http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PARFBC_voting>.
>
>
>    1. Voters can Prefer, Accept, or Reject each candidate. Default is
>    Accept.
>    2. Candidates with a majority of Reject, or with under 25% Prefer, are
>    eliminated, unless that would eliminate all candidates.
>    3. Tally "prefer" ratings for all non-eliminated candidates.
>    4. Find the leader in this tally, and add in "accept" ratings on
>    ballots that don't prefer the leader (if they haven't already been tallied).
>    5. Repeat step 4 until the leader doesn't change. The winner is the
>    final leader.
>
>
> ...
>
> This is pretty much a holy grail system from my perspective. It meets FBC
> (I think; I don't have a proof, but it seems to me it should). It deals
> with a simple chicken dilemma without a slippery slope. It deals with
> center squeeze with naive ballots. I think it even meets the voted majority
> Condorcet criterion, in an election with 3 candidates and where all ballots
> use the full range (and you can add irrelevant "also-rans" to such an
> election without breaking any compliances).
>
> It has a sequential counting process like IRV, and so it fails
> summability; but in most cases, step 4 will not change the outcome, so will
> happen only once. (The main exception is if there's a voted Condorcet
> cycle.)
>
> It even meets weakened versions of both Later No Help and Later No Harm;
> weak enough so that they are compatible with the above passed criteria, but
> strong enough so that I think most voters would be honest. Later No Help
> holds if there's no possible Condorcet cycle; and Later No Harm holds if
> the "later" candidate isn't on the edge of being eliminated.
>
> I think that the explanation is clear and intuitive enough to be
> reasonably acceptable to most voters. It involves only simple adding to
> tallies, not anything couched in terms of sets or multiplication or the
> like.
>
> Does anybody have any reason why this system should not be considered a
> leading contender for "next step after approval"?
>
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>
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