[EM] APR (6): Steve’s 6th dialogue with Sennet

Sennet Williams sennetwilliams at yahoo.com
Thu Feb 4 01:14:21 PST 2016

I'll try to address your questions, but not in the same order.1st, I consider votes "wasted" if the candidates are not beholden to everyone, not just the people who voted for them.   2nd, when IRV is used to elect two winners on the same ballot, the proper system is run the ballots through again after the 1st winner is selected.  Depending on the law, either all ballots are run through again,  OR just the ballots that were  not used to select the winner are run through again.   So, with your example ....this is a wasted exercise.  
3rd, What really matters is that your example is so unrealistic that it is pointless to consider, so I prefer to consider this:3a- In a real IRV election, voters will rank at least 3 candidates:  The people who ranked B second would not be disenfranchised.3b-  In a real IRV election, there are usually a lot more candidates.   SF and Oakland generally have about 10 candidates if the seat is vacant vs 3-4 using simple plurality.  Since B's issues have the widest support, you can be sure that there will be another candidate (E) with almost the same platform as B, which has almost twice the support of A, C or D.   Realistically, B and "E" would win with that platform.  But A, C and D would also have different platforms. (if they understood IRV)  But it seems unlikely that any of those minor candidates could double their support to compete with B.
   From what I have seen with PR, I don't think that voters are two happy with "their" winning candidates, and the elected politicians are more concerned about negotiating with the other (opposing) parties' representatives so that a new election will not be called.   Personally,  If B's  platform is about twice as acceptable as any of the minor candidates, I would rather not having A, C and D making laws that affect me.  But, in real IRV, those candidates would not be taken very seriously.  So they would either have more popular platforms or else they would know that they have no chance of actually winning.  (Some candidates in IRV run to promote their special cause and hope that the major candidates adopt it, but they know that they have no chance of winning themselves.  In the 1st Oakland mayor's race using IRV, there were 6 or 7 candidates who had never even been councilmembers (or higher office) before. None of the minor candidates had anywhere near majority support.  The three major candidates all had much wider support, but the ballots only allowed 3 rankings.  So many ballots were exhausted on minor candidates that we just don't know how many would have also shown their support for the 3 major candidates if they could.  I believe that Kaplan and Perata probably both had supermajority support, but Quan ran a more effective campaign.  Luckily for all the people who didn't vote, most of the local politicians elected using IRV were the best candidate for the job.  They focused on outreach to everyone, not just one group and campaign money is practically irrelevant.  
The fact is, to win an IRV/condorcet election generally requires the widest support of any election system, which means that more voters "matter" than any other system, their votes are not wasted.  The Oakland election was probably an anomaly because only three rankings were allowed,  so a lot of voters did not get to indicate that they would also  support  Kaplan or Perata in addition to minor candidates that personally appealed to them.  (There was a city-wide understanding that Perata, Kaplan or possibly Quan would win anyway no matter who you voted for) -W
#yiv7101487475 #yiv7101487475 -- .yiv7101487475hmmessage P{margin:0px;padding:0px;}#yiv7101487475 body.yiv7101487475hmmessage{font-size:12pt;font-family:Calibri;}#yiv7101487475     On Tuesday, February 2, 2016 12:43 PM, steve bosworth <stevebosworth at hotmail.com> wrote:
 [EM] APR (6): Steve’s 6th dialogue with Sennet> Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2016 11:16:54 +0000 (UTC)8"
To Sennet (W) from Steve (S): S: I would like to understand why you asserted in your last postcopied below that “In fact, all votes would be wasted”.  Please also note that, within [squarebrackets], I have added a full copy of the relevant paragraph to which you wereresponding but had shortened.Please recall that this was one of Kristofer’s examples to discoverwhat I mean by a “wasted vote”.  What Imean is any citizen’s vote that does not add to the voting strength in thelegislative assembly of the elected candidate that citizen favors and hasranked (voted for).  With thisdefinition, do you agree that my response explains how APR would allow no votesto be wasted in this “2 seat” election, e.g. for the election of the 2 Senatorsfrom a given state?Perhaps you are using a different meaning of “waste”.  Please explain.  Why did you believe B should have beenelected when the 10 citizens who wanted B preferred A and the 11 that wanted Bpreferred C.  If this were an election of2 Senators, i.e. C and D, 23 of the 33 citizens would be happy that they willbe represented respectively by their first choice candidates.  How would your election of B be better? Whichcandidate would you elect for the 2nd seat?  Why? What is your definition of an ideal but possible “democracy”?  Does it honor the principle of "one-person-one-vote"? 
> K: > >> For something like
> > >> 
> > >> 10: A>B
> > >> 11: C>B
> > >> 12: D
> > >> 
> > >> and two seats, electing A and C wastes votes (12 of them tobe exact),
> > >> but electing B and D doesn't.
> > > 
> > > S: No. In this case, APR would elect C with a ?weighted vote? of11 and
> > > D with a weighted vote of 12. The 10 votes given to A would bewasted ….[S: No.  In this case, APR would elect C with a “weighted vote”of 11 and D with a weighted vote of 12.  The 10 votes given to A would bewasted only by ordinary IRV using “weighted votes”.  APR would not wastethese 10 because it gives each citizen who fails to rank any candidate that iselected the option of requiring her 1st choice but eliminatedcandidate to transfer her one vote to the elected candidate who that eliminatedcandidate trusts most (e.g. see the Sample Secret Ballot at the end of thearticle).]  
W: > In fact, all votes would be wasted.? The voters are leftdisenfranchised with two opposing paid office-holders (C & D)? when in factthe most voters supported B.? C & D would take office and negotiate witheach other for what they want regardless of what the voters wanted.? 
> In a more U.S. realistic scenario (one winner), the serious politicianswould all have followed the priorities of the most voters, like "B",and the best looking candidate with B's priorities would win and take officeand break their promises so that she could promise them again in the nextelection.? 
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL:<http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20160131/73e67cb8/attachment-0001.htm>

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20160204/e4c0a07f/attachment.htm>

More information about the Election-Methods mailing list