[EM] APR (6): Steve’s 6th dialogue with Sennet

steve bosworth stevebosworth at hotmail.com
Tue Feb 2 12:42:42 PST 2016


[EM] APR (6): Steve’s 6th dialogue with Sennet

> Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2016 11:16:54 +0000 (UTC)

> From: Sennet Williams <sennetwilliams at yahoo.com>

> To: "election-methods at lists.electorama.com"

> <election-methods at lists.electorama.com>

> Subject: [EM] A, B. C, D: all votes were wasted

> Message-ID:

> <1636243449.3062727.1454239014437.JavaMail.yahoo at mail.yahoo.com>

> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"

To Sennet (W) from Steve (S):

 S: I would like to understand why you asserted in your last post
copied below that “In fact, all votes would be wasted”.  Please also note that, within [square
brackets], I have added a full copy of the relevant paragraph to which you were
responding but had shortened.

Please recall that this was one of Kristofer’s examples to discover
what I mean by a “wasted vote”.  What I
mean is any citizen’s vote that does not add to the voting strength in the
legislative assembly of the elected candidate that citizen favors and has
ranked (voted for).  With this
definition, do you agree that my response explains how APR would allow no votes
to be wasted in this “2 seat” election, e.g. for the election of the 2 Senators
from a given state?

Perhaps you are using a different meaning of “waste”.  Please explain.  Why did you believe B should have been
elected when the 10 citizens who wanted B preferred A and the 11 that wanted B
preferred C.  If this were an election of
2 Senators, i.e. C and D, 23 of the 33 citizens would be happy that they will
be represented respectively by their first choice candidates.  How would your election of B be better? Which
candidate would you elect for the 2nd seat?  Why? 
What is your definition of an ideal but possible “democracy”?  Does it honor the principle of "one-person-one-vote"?


> K: > >> For something like

> > >> 

> > >> 10: A>B

> > >> 11: C>B

> > >> 12: D

> > >> 

> > >> and two seats, electing A and C wastes votes (12 of them to
be exact),

> > >> but electing B and D doesn't.

> > > 

> > > S: No. In this case, APR would elect C with a ?weighted vote? of
11 and

> > > D with a weighted vote of 12. The 10 votes given to A would be
wasted ….

[S: No.  In this case, APR would elect C with a “weighted vote”
of 11 and D with a weighted vote of 12.  The 10 votes given to A would be
wasted only by ordinary IRV using “weighted votes”.  APR would not waste
these 10 because it gives each citizen who fails to rank any candidate that is
elected the option of requiring her 1st choice but eliminated
candidate to transfer her one vote to the elected candidate who that eliminated
candidate trusts most (e.g. see the Sample Secret Ballot at the end of the

W: > In fact, all votes would be wasted.? The voters are left
disenfranchised with two opposing paid office-holders (C & D)? when in fact
the most voters supported B.? C & D would take office and negotiate with
each other for what they want regardless of what the voters wanted.? 

> In a more U.S. realistic scenario (one winner), the serious politicians
would all have followed the priorities of the most voters, like "B",
and the best looking candidate with B's priorities would win and take office
and break their promises so that she could promise them again in the next

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