<html><head></head><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:16px"><div id="yiv7101487475"><div id="yui_3_16_0_1_1454574917704_2650"><div style="color:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:16px;" id="yui_3_16_0_1_1454574917704_2649"><div id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13259">I'll try to address your questions, but not in the same order.</div><div dir="ltr" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13259">1st, I consider votes "wasted" if the candidates are not beholden to everyone, not just the people who voted for them. </div><div dir="ltr" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13259">2nd, when IRV is used to elect two winners on the same ballot, the proper system is run the ballots through again after the 1st winner is selected. Depending on the law, either all ballots are run through again, OR just the ballots that were not used to select the winner are run through again. So, with your example ....this is a wasted exercise. </div><div dir="ltr" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13259"><br clear="none"></div><div dir="ltr" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13259">3rd, What really matters is that your example is so unrealistic that it is pointless to consider, so I prefer to consider this:</div><div dir="ltr" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13259">3a- In a real IRV election, voters will rank at least 3 candidates: The people who ranked B second would not be disenfranchised.</div><div dir="ltr" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13259">3b- In a real IRV election, there are usually a lot more candidates. SF and Oakland generally have about 10 candidates if the seat is vacant vs 3-4 using simple plurality. Since B's issues have the widest support, you can be sure that there will be another candidate (E) with almost the same platform as B, which has almost twice the support of A, C or D. Realistically, B and "E" would win with that platform. But A, C and D would also have different platforms. (if they understood IRV) But it seems unlikely that any of those minor candidates could double their support to compete with B.</div><div dir="ltr" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13259"><br></div> <div class="yiv7101487475qtdSeparateBR" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13058" dir="ltr"> From what I have seen with PR, I don't think that voters are two happy with "their" winning candidates, and the elected politicians are more concerned about negotiating with the other (opposing) parties' representatives so that a new election will not be called. Personally, If B's platform is about twice as acceptable as any of the minor candidates, I would rather not having A, C and D making laws that affect me. But, in real IRV, those candidates would not be taken very seriously. So they would either have more popular platforms or else they would know that they have no chance of actually winning. (Some candidates in IRV run to promote their special cause and hope that the major candidates adopt it, but they know that they have no chance of winning themselves. In the 1st Oakland mayor's race using IRV, there were 6 or 7 candidates who had never even been councilmembers (or higher office) before. None of the minor candidates had anywhere near majority support. The three major candidates all had much wider support, but the ballots only allowed 3 rankings. So many ballots were exhausted on minor candidates that we just don't know how many would have also shown their support for the 3 major candidates if they could. I believe that Kaplan and Perata probably both had supermajority support, but Quan ran a more effective campaign. Luckily for all the people who didn't vote, most of the local politicians elected using IRV were the best candidate for the job. They focused on outreach to everyone, not just one group and campaign money is practically irrelevant. </div><div class="yiv7101487475qtdSeparateBR" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13058" dir="ltr"><br clear="none"></div><div class="yiv7101487475qtdSeparateBR" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13058" dir="ltr">The fact is, to win an IRV/condorcet election generally requires the widest support of any election system, which means that more voters "matter" than any other system, their votes are not wasted. The Oakland election was probably an anomaly because only three rankings were allowed, so a lot of voters did not get to indicate that they would also support Kaplan or Perata in addition to minor candidates that personally appealed to them. (There was a city-wide understanding that Perata, Kaplan or possibly Quan would win anyway no matter who you voted for) -W</div><div class="yiv7101487475qtdSeparateBR" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13058" dir="ltr"><br></div><div class="yiv7101487475yqt8325466869" id="yiv7101487475yqtfd59036"><style>#yiv7101487475 #yiv7101487475 --
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#yiv7101487475 </style></div></div></div></div><div class=".yiv7101487475yahoo_quoted" id="yui_3_16_0_1_1454574917704_3066"> <div id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13040" style="font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:16px;"> <div id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13039" style="font-family:HelveticaNeue, Helvetica Neue, Helvetica, Arial, Lucida Grande, sans-serif;font-size:16px;"> <div class="yiv7101487475yqt8325466869" id="yiv7101487475yqtfd23700"><div dir="ltr" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13056"><font id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13130" size="2" face="Arial"> On Tuesday, February 2, 2016 12:43 PM, steve bosworth <stevebosworth@hotmail.com> wrote:<br clear="none"></font></div> <div class="yiv7101487475y_msg_container" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13069"><div id="yiv7101487475"><div id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13068"><div dir="ltr" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13067"><div class="yiv7101487475MsoNormal" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13112" style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;"><span id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13111" style=""><span id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13110" style="">[EM] APR (6): Steve’s 6<sup><font size="2">th</font></sup> dialogue with Sennet</span></span>> Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2016 11:16:54 +0000 (UTC)</div><div class="yiv7101487475MsoNormal" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13083" style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;"><span id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13082" style="">8"<br clear="none">
</span></div><div class="yiv7101487475MsoNormal" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13133" style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="">To Sennet (W) from Steve (S):</span> </div><div class="yiv7101487475MsoNormal" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13066" style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;"><span id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13065" style="">S: I would like to understand why you asserted in your last post
copied below that “In fact, all votes would be wasted”.<span style=""> </span>Please also note that, within [square
brackets], I have added a full copy of the relevant paragraph to which you were
responding but had shortened.</span></div><font face="Times New Roman">
</font><div class="yiv7101487475MsoNormal" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13136" style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;"><span id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13135" style="">Please recall that this was one of Kristofer’s examples to discover
what I mean by a “wasted vote”.<span style=""> </span>What I
mean is any citizen’s vote that does not add to the voting strength in the
legislative assembly of the elected candidate that citizen favors and has
ranked (voted for).<span style=""> </span>With this
definition, do you agree that my response explains how APR would allow no votes
to be wasted in this “2 seat” election, e.g. for the election of the 2 Senators
from a given state?</span></div><font face="Times New Roman">
</font><div class="yiv7101487475MsoNormal" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13138" style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;"><span id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13382" style="">Perhaps you are using a different meaning of “waste”.<span style=""> </span>Please explain.<span style=""> </span>Why did you believe B should have been
elected when the 10 citizens who wanted B preferred A and the 11 that wanted B
preferred C.<span style=""> </span>If this were an election of
2 Senators, i.e. C and D, 23 of the 33 citizens would be happy that they will
be represented respectively by their first choice candidates.<span style=""> </span>How would your election of B be better? Which
candidate would you elect for the 2<sup><font size="2">nd</font></sup> seat?<span style=""> </span>Why?<span style="">
</span>What is your definition of an ideal but possible “democracy”? Does it honor the principle of "one-person-one-vote"?</span></div><font face="Times New Roman">
</font><div class="yiv7101487475MsoNormal" id="yiv7101487475yui_3_16_0_1_1454567655294_13404" style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;"><span style=""><span style=""> </span><br clear="none">
> K: > >> For something like<br clear="none">
> > >> <br clear="none">
> > >> 10: A>B<br clear="none">
> > >> 11: C>B<br clear="none">
> > >> 12: D<br clear="none">
> > >> <br clear="none">
> > >> and two seats, electing A and C wastes votes (12 of them to
be exact),<br clear="none">
> > >> but electing B and D doesn't.<br clear="none">
> > > <br clear="none">
> > > S: No. In this case, APR would elect C with a ?weighted vote? of
11 and<br clear="none">
> > > D with a weighted vote of 12. The 10 votes given to A would be
wasted ….</span></div><font face="Times New Roman">
</font><div class="yiv7101487475MsoNormal" style="margin:0in 0in 8pt;"><span style="">[S: No. In this case, APR would elect C with a “weighted vote”
of 11 and D with a weighted vote of 12. The 10 votes given to A would be
wasted only by ordinary IRV using “weighted votes”. APR would not waste
these 10 because it gives each citizen who fails to rank any candidate that is
elected the option of requiring her 1<sup><font size="2">st</font></sup> choice but eliminated
candidate to transfer her one vote to the elected candidate who that eliminated
candidate trusts most (e.g. see the Sample Secret Ballot at the end of the
article).] <br clear="none">
W: > In fact, all votes would be wasted.? The voters are left
disenfranchised with two opposing paid office-holders (C & D)? when in fact
the most voters supported B.? C & D would take office and negotiate with
each other for what they want regardless of what the voters wanted.? <br clear="none">
> In a more U.S. realistic scenario (one winner), the serious politicians
would all have followed the priorities of the most voters, like "B",
and the best looking candidate with B's priorities would win and take office
and break their promises so that she could promise them again in the next
election.? <br clear="none">
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