[EM] Poll (to look at results, not vote in). Article from Democracy Chronicles.

[Michael Ossipoff]

VOTE NOW: The Voting Systems Poll

December 11, 2016 by Michael Ossipoff
<https://democracychronicles.com/author/michael-ossipoff/>

[image: The Voting Systems Poll]This is an article that links to a poll at
Condorcet Internet Voting Service. The poll is intended for people who are
new to voting-systems, and of course isn't for people at EM.

I'm posting the poll-link because it seems to me that the results (even
though there were only a few voters) are of interest. They show that
Approval & Score are what people like.

I strongly suggest that people at EM not vote in this poll, because, if you
did, the poll would no longer tell anything about the preferences of the
public.

Because the voting systems had to be defined, and their advantages &
comparisons discussed, only a few people are voting in the poll.

That's understandable, though more participation would have been desired.
But even a few votes from the public suggests public preferences.


*Here’s a link to the poll: *

*http://civs.cs.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/vote.pl?id=E_fa18e6840b070f44
<http://civs.cs.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/vote.pl?id=E_fa18e6840b070f44>*

It’s a poll to find out:

   1. which ones of 7 good voting-systems would be accepted

and

   1. which of them is the overall favorite among poll-respondents.

It’s a rank-balloting poll, in which you’ll be asked to rank the
voting-systems in order of preference.

Let me briefly define seven good voting systems, and briefly state a few of
their main advantages. I’ll start with the two most briefly-defined and
easily implemented voting-systems, and then discuss five rank-balloting
voting-systems.

In voting-system discussion, the word “method” is used to mean
“voting-system”, and that’s what I mean here when I say “method”.
1. Approval Voting: *Definition:*

You can, by marking their names on the ballot, “approve” as many or as few
candidates as you want to.

The winner is the candidate approved by the most voters.
*Advantages:*

   1. You never have any possible reason to vote someone else over your
   favorite (That’s called the “Favorite-Burial-Critrerion” (FBC)–I’ll cite
   FBC for most of the other voting-systems here, as well).
   2. The most easily-implemented. Doesn’t require any new software,
   balloting-equipment or new kind of ballots. The only change is 2 words
   added to the ballot-instruction: Where it now says “Vote for 1”, it would
   instead say “Vote for 1 or more”. Cost of change to Approval voting: Zero.
   3. Approval is “Set-Voting”. You can vote any set of candidates, chosen
   by you, over the others, by approving only them.

2. Score Voting: *Definition:*

You assign to each candidate a rating from 0 to 10, or from 0 to 100, etc.

The winner is the candidate whose ratings-total, among all the voters, is
the highest.
*Advantages:*

Same as Approval.

The flexible ratings allow more expressivity.
3. Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV): *Definition:*

You vote a ranking of candidates.

The Count:

Repeatedly, delete from all the rankings the candidate who currently tops
the fewest rankings.

When one candidate tops most of the rankings, s/he wins.
*Advantages & Disadvantage:*

Has no chicken-dilemma.

IRV has some excellent properties, but it can eliminate the middle
compromise, causing some people to rank that compromise over their
favorite, to protect the compromise from elimination.

IRV shouldn’t be enacted unless people understand and accept that problem,
and wouldn’t feel the need to rank someone over their favorite.
4. Bucklin Voting: *Definition:*

Bucklin is Stepwise Approval. You vote a ranking. In each of successive
“rounds”, each ballot gives a vote to each candidate that it ranks at the
rank-level corresponding to that round.

For example, in the 1st round, each ballot gives a vote to each of its
1st-ranked candidate(s). In the 2nd round, each ballot gives a vote to each
of its 2nd-ranked candidate(s)….etc.

If, in a round, one or more candidates gets a majority (a vote total
greater than half the number of voters), then the one with the most votes
wins.

If, when all the rankings have given votes to all of their candidates, no
one has a majority, then the candidate with the most votes wins.
*Advantages:*

Meets FBC (defined above).

More stable than IRV. No unpleasant compromise-elimination surprises.

Was used in at  least 39 cities during the Progressive Era.
5. Benham’s Method: *Definition:*

Do IRV until there’s an un-deleted candidate who pairwise-beats each one of
the other un-eliminated candidates.

X pairwise-beats Y if more voters rank X over Y than vice-versa.
*Advantage:*

Shares IRV’s advantages, but always elects a candidate who pairwise-beats
everyone else, if there is such a candidate.
6. Majority-Defeat-Disqualification Approval (MDDA): *Definition:*

You rank, in order of preference, the candidates whom you especially want
to elect (instead of someone else winning). You’re counted as approving
every candidate that you rank, unless you expressly deny them approval.

The winner is the most approved candidate who doesn’t have another
candidate ranked over hir by a majority.

Additionally, you have the option to indicate that you deny approval to any
1 or more candidates whom you rank.
*Advantages:*

   1. Meets FBC
   2. Has no chicken-dilemma problem.
   3. Particularly good protection for higher-ranked candidates over
   lower-ranked ones. Especially for top-ranked candidates over all other ones.

*Disadvantage:*

Can fail “Mono-Add-Plump” criterion, meaning that the addition of a new
ballot to the election can cause a candidate to lose, though he’d win
without the addition of the new ballot—and can do so even if that ballot
votes only for that candidate.

That’s a purely cosmetic “embarrassment criterion”, without any operational
or strategic importance. It doesn’t cause any voting problem. But of course
it has to be disclosed anyway.
7. MDDAsc: *Definition:*

Same as MDDA, but with one additional rule:

For any pair of candidates whom you don’t rank, you’re counted as ranking
each one over the other, with half of a vote. That’s what the “sc” in its
name refers to. It stands for “symmetric completion” (of short rankings).
*Advantage over MDDA:*

Doesn’t fail Mono-Add-Plump.

Disadvantage compared to MDDA:

Less reliable protection of  higher middle-ranked candidates against lower
middle-ranked candidates. (But still fully protects top-ranked candidates
against everyone else.)

Protection of middle-ranked candidates against each other is less important
than protecting all  ranked candidates against unranked ones, and
protecting top-ranked against the others.

The matter of which of MDDA or MDDAsc you rank over the other depends on
which you want more—Mono-Add-Plump, or more reliable protection between
your middle-ranked candidates.

*Here again is a link to the poll:*
http://civs.cs.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/vote.pl?id=E_fa18e6840b070f44
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