[EM] Meeting Brams' requirement to elect majority-approved, if there are any.

[Michael Ossipoff]

I forgot to add:

When MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO is used to choose between 2 or more
candidates who are majority-approved, then majority-defeats &
pairwise-opposition by the not-majority-approved candidates count in the
MDDA or MMPO count.    ...not just majority-defeats & pairwise-opposition
by majority-approved candidates.

Michael Ossipoff

On Mon, Dec 12, 2016 at 8:28 PM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
wrote:

> I may have already mentioned that Steven Brams suggested that, instead of
> starting with a pairwise-count, and using Approval only for tiebreaking, it
> would be better to always elect a majority-approved candidate if there is
> one.
>
> But one reason to use rank-balloting is because many people might need it
> for the reassurance that they'd need in order to overcompromise, or refuse
> to support a rival at all.
>
> So it seems to me that methods that look first at pairwise-count--methods
> such as MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, & IC,MMPO better satisfy that need for a
> rank-count method.
>
> But there could maybe some future electorate that doesn't have that need,
> and maybe, then, there'd be a good case for ensuring that a
> majority-approved candidate is elected if there is one.
>
> With such a hypothetical electorate of the future, the only real purpose
> of rankings would be to provide an easy, convenient & reliable way to avoid
> chicken-dilemma.
>
> I'd like to suggest two such methods, which meet FBC, provide an easy way
> to avoid chicken-dilemma, and elect a majority-approved candidate if there
> is one.
>
> 1. Majority-Approval Pairwise (MAPW):
>
> Rankings. Default is, all ranked candidates are approved, but you can
> un-approve any particular candidates that you want to.
>
> If no one is majority-approved, then use MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO.
>
> Otherwise, just elect the Approval winner.
>
> *2. *Majority-Approval Pairwise2 (MAPW2):
>
> Rankings. Default is all ranked candidates are approved, but you can
> un-approve any particular candidates that you want to.
>
> If no one is majority-approved, then use MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO.
>
> If 1 candidate is majority-approved, s/he wins.
>
> If 2 or more candidates are majority-approved, then choose among them by
> MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO.
>
> -------------------------
>
> MAPW is simpler, and has more approval & less pairwise-count.
>
> MAPW & MAPW2 are for a time when the only reason for using rankings is to
> easily avoid chicken-dilemma, and it's desired to use a method that's as
> much Approval as possible.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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