[EM] Meeting Brams' requirement to elect majority-approved, if there are any.

[Michael Ossipoff]

I may have already mentioned that Steven Brams suggested that, instead of
starting with a pairwise-count, and using Approval only for tiebreaking, it
would be better to always elect a majority-approved candidate if there is
one.

But one reason to use rank-balloting is because many people might need it
for the reassurance that they'd need in order to overcompromise, or refuse
to support a rival at all.

So it seems to me that methods that look first at pairwise-count--methods
such as MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, & IC,MMPO better satisfy that need for a
rank-count method.

But there could maybe some future electorate that doesn't have that need,
and maybe, then, there'd be a good case for ensuring that a
majority-approved candidate is elected if there is one.

With such a hypothetical electorate of the future, the only real purpose of
rankings would be to provide an easy, convenient & reliable way to avoid
chicken-dilemma.

I'd like to suggest two such methods, which meet FBC, provide an easy way
to avoid chicken-dilemma, and elect a majority-approved candidate if there
is one.

1. Majority-Approval Pairwise (MAPW):

Rankings. Default is, all ranked candidates are approved, but you can
un-approve any particular candidates that you want to.

If no one is majority-approved, then use MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO.

Otherwise, just elect the Approval winner.

*2. *Majority-Approval Pairwise2 (MAPW2):

Rankings. Default is all ranked candidates are approved, but you can
un-approve any particular candidates that you want to.

If no one is majority-approved, then use MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO.

If 1 candidate is majority-approved, s/he wins.

If 2 or more candidates are majority-approved, then choose among them by
MDDA, MDDAsc, MMPOsc, or IC,MMPO.

-------------------------

MAPW is simpler, and has more approval & less pairwise-count.

MAPW & MAPW2 are for a time when the only reason for using rankings is to
easily avoid chicken-dilemma, and it's desired to use a method that's as
much Approval as possible.

Michael Ossipoff
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