[EM] Top-Ranking, Approval, Score, RP(wv)

Fri Dec 9 11:25:17 PST 2016

I’d said:

>* When I used the example of MDDA & MDDAsc, to illustrate that it's better
to*

>* equal-top-rank your strong top-set, rather than choosing among them by*

>* ranking them in order of preference--That wasn't intended as criticism
of*

>* MDDA & MDDAsc.*

>

>* The fact of it being better to equal-rank the set that is important to
you*

>* instead of choosing among them is true with other rank methods too.*

>

>* In particular, it's true of Condorcet & Bucklin. It would be true of IRV*

>* too, if IRV allowed equal-ranking.*

*Robert replied:*

if IRV allowed equal-ranking, who of the equal-ranked 2nd choice are
promoted to the 1st choice (because that's the only choice that gets
counted in IRV) when the 1st choice is eliminated?

[endquote]

All of them, of course.

But I’m not advocating IRV with equal-top-ranking. As Kevin pointed our
some years ago, IRV with equal-top-ranking still fails FBC. I don’t propose
it or advocate it.

>* I don't have proof that it's, in principle, a*

property of _all_

>* ranking-methods, but I don't know of an exception.*

lemme see, you're claiming that, without an exception that you know of, in
any ranked method it is an advisable strategy to equally rank all
candidates that you "sorta like"?

[endquote]

No.

I’m saying that I don’t know of a rank method in which it wouldn’t be best
to top-rank all of your strong top-set.

Your strong top-set is more than “sorta like”.

You said:

you think voters that [who] are free to unequally

rank them (but not to have to score them) would prefer to follow your
tactical advise in their particular circumstances that you have no idea of?

[endquote]

I didn’t say anything about what voters would prefer to do.

But I’ve been emphasizing thoughout that a lot of voting-reform advocates
want rankings, insist on rankings. I’ve also been repeating that some
overcompromisers & rival parties would do better with rankings than with
Approval.

Some overcompromisers need FBC, so that they won’t feel a need to rank
Compromsie over Favorite.

I’ve observed people voting more honestly with Score than with Approval,
which is why I also strongly advocate Score. I’ve also noticed better
honesty in ranked polls.

I’m just saying that, when voting in a rank method that allows
equal-top-ranking, if you want to maximize the probability of electing from
your strong top-set, then top-rank them all.

As I said, I don’t guarantee that there are no exceptions. It’s just that I
don’t know of one.

You said:

you can discern that a voter's best political interest would be served by
that?

[endquote]

Yes.

You said:

and then you think it's little burden to the RCV voter to

actually grok that decision in the voting booth: "Lessee, I really like
Andy over Bob, but I can live with either and since Michael Ossipoff
recommends equally-ranking the top set, I'll rank Bob equal to Andy, just
to make sure that this will more effectively defeat Curtis whom I don't want

elected?"

[endquote]

Correct, if Andy & Bob are in your strong top-set, and Curtis is in your
strong bottom-set.

By the definition of the strong top & bottom sets, the important thing is
which set the winner comes from.   Choosing _between_ your strong top &
bottom sets is incomparably more important than choosing within your strong
top-set.

So, in a rank method, top-rank Andy & Bob. In Approval, approve Andy & Bob.

You said:

you think a voter would prefer that to simply ranking Andy > Bob > Curtis?

[endquote]

If I believed that to always be so, then I’d only advocate Approval. I
recognize and admit that many people want or would need ranking in order of
preference. I’m merely saying that it’s more advisable to top-rank your
top-set.

That’s one reason why I say that, as a voting-system reform, Approval is
good enough.  …except that there’s a psychological need for rankings,
partly to avoid the voting-errors of overcompromisers & rival parties,
which is why I’d include Bucklin, MDDA, & MDDAsc in a complete
voting-system.   …along with Approval & Score.

You said:

the main reason we want to use other systems than Plurality is to reduce
the burden of tactical voting on voters and let them express their
political interest with little worry about shooting

themselves in the foot and voter regret.  tactical voting is not pleasant.

[endquote]

Agreed.

By “tactical voting” I mean voting according to alleged predictive
information.

I claim that voting in Approval doesn’t need predictive information. Voting
in Approval needn’t be tactical. We disagree on that, and I guess that’s an
impasse.

Top-ranking your top-set isn’t tactical voting.

You said:

and another reason is to reduce the effect of voting *strategy* by
campaigns or interest groups trying to swing elections by persuading a
quantity of voters to vote a certain way.

[quote]

Not so much Internet, but corporate mass-media. TV & radio “news” &
commentary, including NPR.

But yes, a good voting system, one that meets FBC, frees voters from the
supposed lesser-of-2-evils problem that the media would otherwise impose on
them.

But,if we could get a better voting-system, if we could get honest
verifiable vote-counting, then we’d surely be able to get honest, open,
participatory & agenda-free media too.

All of those genuine-democracy requirements would be present in Utopia.

You said:

i don't see how this advice

is attractive to regular voters, who want to be heard, who don't want
surprizes because of irregularities.

[endquote]

Top-voting your strong top-set is the best way to avoid an unpleasant
surprise.

You said:

why would they be motivated to do that?  why would they be motivated to
even try to remember such advice and its detail?

[quote]

What detail? Top-vote your strong top-set.

-------------------------------------------

By the way, yes I was a bit unfair to Ranked-Pairs(wv)  (…of which MAM is
the best refinement).

Among the methods that look only at pairwise-defeat-strength. RP(wv) is the
ideal best.

Its protection of ranked candidates against unranked ones is unequalled,
because the defeat of a CWs requires burial, and burial is (hopefully)
deterred by wv’s penalty for failed burial.

It’s just that RV doesn’t meet FBC, and has chicken dilemma, without
offering any easy, convenient and reliable way to avoid it.

Besides, that burial-deterrence is somewhat iffy, because, if the CWs is in
your strong bottom-set, you aren’t really deterred from trying burial
against hir. ….and hence the possibility of the perpetual burial fiasco.

MDDA & MDDAsc meet FBC, & provide a convenient, easy & reliable way to
avoid chicken-dilemma.

If you’re going to propose a rank-balloting method (with the
acceptance-problem that all rank-balloting methods have), then propose one
that meets FBC & doesn’t have a chicken-dilemma problem. By avoiding
chicken-dilemma problem, and keeping FBC, you’re getting the full promise
of rank-balloting.

When you propose a voting system for Burlington, I’d suggest a multi-method
proposal:

Approval

Score

Bucklin

MDDA

MDDAsc

Offer those to an initiative-proposal committee. Talk about them with
members of the public, in conversations, polls, and focus-groups.

Don’t underestimate the benefit from Approval & Score.

Score is just Approval, with the option for fractional approval, for
greater sincerity, to soften the results of overcompromisers’ & rival
parties’ possibly-mistaken strategic voting.

Approval & Score have much better chance of acceptance by the public,
compared to any ranking-method.

Then there’s also the fact that Approval doesn’t require any new
balloting-equipment, ballots or software…other than turning-off the
provision that detects & rejects “overvotes”.

The IRV phenomenon gives an erroneous impression of the public
acceptability of ranking-methods. IRV got its popularity only by heavy
promotion everywhere, probably achieved by very heavy funding. Money can
accomplish almost anything, when it comes to convincing the public.

Michael Ossipoff

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