[EM] New Hugo (Science Fiction Award) voting method

[Andy Jennings]

Jameson Quinn, who's on this list, was working with the Hugo awards to come
up with this system.

I believe he proposed simple systems first, but several wrinkles came up
which necessitated the complexity.

I'll email him and see if I can get him to chime in here.

On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 8:29 AM, <mrouse1 at mrouse.com> wrote:

> As an addendum, they are calling this method “single divisible vote with
> least popular elimination," which I haven't heard of before.
>
>
> Mike
>
>
>> On 2015-08-24 04:06, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>>
>>> On 08/24/2015 02:27 AM, Michael Rouse wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure how many people here are fans of science fiction, but there
>>>> was a big brouhaha at this years awards (which I'll ignore), and one of
>>>> the results was the proposal of a new method of choosing winners:
>>>>
>>>> *Short Title: E Pluribus Hugo (Out of the Many, a Hugo)*
>>>> Moved, to amend section 3.8 (Tallying of Nominations), section 3.9
>>>> (Notification and Acceptance), and section 3.11 (Tallying of Votes) as
>>>> follows:
>>>>
>>>
>>> [snip]
>>>
>>> So this is basically cumulative voting IRV? I suppose it's better than
>>> ordinary IRV, but if they're using an Approval ballot, why not just use
>>> Approval to begin with?
>>>
>>> Do they want a proportional representation method or a majoritarian one?
>>> The reference to avoiding slates seem to suggest to me that they want a
>>> proportional representation method, or at least something that is closer
>>> to a PR method.
>>>
>>> As a positional elimination method, it could suffer path dependence.
>>> Consider someone nominating (voting for) X, Y, and Z. Say now that Y is
>>> very narrowly eliminated at some point, but if the person had voted for
>>> X and Y alone, he would have given enough of his vote to Y to have kept
>>> Y from being eliminated. So the claim that "[i]n other words, you can
>>> safely nominate anything you feel is Hugo-worthy" doesn't seem to be
>>> strictly true. You can safely nominate anything that is relatively
>>> unpopular, but if it gets popular enough, it may draw enough support
>>> away from the others you would also like to nominate.
>>>
>>> If I were to construct a majoritarian ballot system with Approval
>>> ballots, I would just use Approval. There's a similar "drawing away from
>>> other popular candidates" problem (the chicken/Burr thing), but Approval
>>> is much simpler and doesn't repeated iteration.
>>>
>>> For PR, the question is much harder. With computers, you could use PAV,
>>> sequential PAV or birational voting. However, the non-sequential ones
>>> require a lot of recounts and are probably not feasible for manual
>>> elections. Sequential ones are simpler but the proportionality might not
>>> be obvious.
>>>
>>
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