[EM] New Hugo (Science Fiction Award) voting method

[mrouse1 at mrouse.com]

That would be awesome -- there are too many emails over there to read in 
one sitting! :)
Mike

On 2015-08-24 10:49, Andy Jennings wrote:
> Jameson Quinn, who's on this list, was working with the Hugo awards to
> come up with this system.
> 
> I believe he proposed simple systems first, but several wrinkles came
> up which necessitated the complexity.
> 
> I'll email him and see if I can get him to chime in here.
> 
> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 8:29 AM, <mrouse1 at mrouse.com> wrote:
> 
>> As an addendum, they are calling this method “single divisible
>> vote with least popular elimination," which I haven't heard of
>> before.
>> 
>> Mike
>> 
>> On 2015-08-24 04:06, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
>> On 08/24/2015 02:27 AM, Michael Rouse wrote:
>> 
>> I'm not sure how many people here are fans of science fiction, but
>> there
>> was a big brouhaha at this years awards (which I'll ignore), and
>> one of
>> the results was the proposal of a new method of choosing winners:
>> 
>> *Short Title: E Pluribus Hugo (Out of the Many, a Hugo)*
>> Moved, to amend section 3.8 (Tallying of Nominations), section 3.9
>> (Notification and Acceptance), and section 3.11 (Tallying of Votes)
>> as
>> follows:
>> 
>> [snip]
>> 
>> So this is basically cumulative voting IRV? I suppose it's better
>> than
>> ordinary IRV, but if they're using an Approval ballot, why not just
>> use
>> Approval to begin with?
>> 
>> Do they want a proportional representation method or a majoritarian
>> one?
>> The reference to avoiding slates seem to suggest to me that they
>> want a
>> proportional representation method, or at least something that is
>> closer
>> to a PR method.
>> 
>> As a positional elimination method, it could suffer path
>> dependence.
>> Consider someone nominating (voting for) X, Y, and Z. Say now that
>> Y is
>> very narrowly eliminated at some point, but if the person had voted
>> for
>> X and Y alone, he would have given enough of his vote to Y to have
>> kept
>> Y from being eliminated. So the claim that "[i]n other words, you
>> can
>> safely nominate anything you feel is Hugo-worthy" doesn't seem to
>> be
>> strictly true. You can safely nominate anything that is relatively
>> unpopular, but if it gets popular enough, it may draw enough
>> support
>> away from the others you would also like to nominate.
>> 
>> If I were to construct a majoritarian ballot system with Approval
>> ballots, I would just use Approval. There's a similar "drawing away
>> from
>> other popular candidates" problem (the chicken/Burr thing), but
>> Approval
>> is much simpler and doesn't repeated iteration.
>> 
>> For PR, the question is much harder. With computers, you could use
>> PAV,
>> sequential PAV or birational voting. However, the non-sequential
>> ones
>> require a lot of recounts and are probably not feasible for manual
>> elections. Sequential ones are simpler but the proportionality
>> might not
>> be obvious.
> 
>  ----
>  Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em [1] for
> list info
> 
>  ----
>  Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em [1] for
> list info
> 
> 
> 
> Links:
> ------
> [1] http://electorama.com/em
> 
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list 
> info