[EM] acceptable Chicken Proof methods (was chain climbing)

Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_elmet at t-online.de
Wed May 28 02:12:00 PDT 2014


(belated reply)

On 04/29/2014 12:53 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
>
> Kristopher,
>
> you suggested ratings or grading, including MJ as possibilities.
>
> But these cannot (at least in their present forms) be chicken proof.

I suppose this is related to the general proof that monotone score rules 
where every candidate's score is calculated by that candidate's ratings 
alone can't reward non-Approval strategy more than Approval strategy.

In retrospect, it then doesn't seem that surprising that rules whose 
strategy is Approval-like would also behave like Approval with respect 
to CD (which is a strategy criterion).

In part, my answer of "grades and/or ratings" to "where can we go from 
Approval?" was intended to be a more general one. If we need more 
information than just rankings and the binary options given by Approval, 
then grades or ratings may provide it. But that does no good, in the CD 
context, if they're poisoned anyway, and I do understand that.

But could we use ratings or grades to augment a method so that it can 
distinguish settings where the CD-ish ballot is sincere from ones where 
it is not? Well, if so, it can't be like MJ, Range, Approval etc (if 
there is a  connection between the proof mentioned above and CD 
failure). But how about something like cardinal pairwise? Could that be 
adapted to increase the resistance?



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