[EM] acceptable Chicken Proof methods (was chain climbing)
km_elmet at t-online.de
Wed May 28 02:12:00 PDT 2014
On 04/29/2014 12:53 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
> you suggested ratings or grading, including MJ as possibilities.
> But these cannot (at least in their present forms) be chicken proof.
I suppose this is related to the general proof that monotone score rules
where every candidate's score is calculated by that candidate's ratings
alone can't reward non-Approval strategy more than Approval strategy.
In retrospect, it then doesn't seem that surprising that rules whose
strategy is Approval-like would also behave like Approval with respect
to CD (which is a strategy criterion).
In part, my answer of "grades and/or ratings" to "where can we go from
Approval?" was intended to be a more general one. If we need more
information than just rankings and the binary options given by Approval,
then grades or ratings may provide it. But that does no good, in the CD
context, if they're poisoned anyway, and I do understand that.
But could we use ratings or grades to augment a method so that it can
distinguish settings where the CD-ish ballot is sincere from ones where
it is not? Well, if so, it can't be like MJ, Range, Approval etc (if
there is a connection between the proof mentioned above and CD
failure). But how about something like cardinal pairwise? Could that be
adapted to increase the resistance?
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