[EM] acceptable Chicken Proof methods (was chain climbing)
km_elmet at t-online.de
Thu May 15 00:09:47 PDT 2014
On 04/29/2014 12:53 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
> you suggested ratings or grading, including MJ as possibilities.
> But these cannot (at least in their present forms) be chicken proof.
I suspect this is because voters can take them closer to Approval
without repercussions. As I mentioned in another post here, all methods
where candidate X's rating only takes the scores for X into account and
the where function that maps the rating vector into a rating is
monotone, one may move one's vote closer to Approval-style without being
harmed. And Approval is, as we know, not CD-proof.
I'm thinking something that uses ratings/grades in a way that goes
somewhat in a different direction than the rankings could work. Cardinal
pairwise is an example (say, with one of the resistant Condorcet methods
that have been mentioned). The very broad idea would be that the ratings
let the method distinguish between honest ballots and strategic ones
where this would otherwise not be possible. Of course, it's possible for
the strategizers to manipulate the ratings, too, so this distinction
must primarily come from the ballots that are not involved in the strategy.
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