[EM] New Criterion

[C.Benham]

45 A=C (sincere is A or A>B)
35 B>A
20 C>B

B is the sincere IRV winner (and sincere CW), but if the method is 
ER-IRV(whole) then B is eliminated and A wins.

(This example also works if you change the 45/35/20 numbers to, say, 
49/48/3).

Chris Benham



On 5/21/2014 4:29 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> Chris:
> ER-IRV(whole), I've always referred to as "Approval IRV", or AIRV.
> For the Green scenario, I'm not botherd by IRV's failure of Condorcet 
> and FBC, for reasons that I've given (vastly different media and 
> electorate than we have now in the U.S.)
> We should all assume that we're in a mutual majority, because (as I've 
> said) we'll be in one if our assessments are right, and if others' 
> judgement is as good as our own.
> So, in the Green scenario, I'm not so concerned about the strategy 
> problems of voters who aren't in a mutual majorty (MM).
> IRV is great for you if you're in a MM. Additionally, as you've 
> mentioned, IRV meets LNHa and LNHe.
> So I don't think IRV needs any mofification, and IRV, without AIRV, 
> would be fine.
> But I like Benham and Woodall because their Condorcet Criterion (CC) 
> compliance makes things less strategucally drastic for vorters who 
> aren't in a MM. Not that that's important; but it's a nice little 
> luxury, just in case the GPUS voters are convinced by their party's 
> advice, to rank the Democrats directly below GPUS, resultng in the 
> progressives not being a voted mutual majority.
> ...And, for that same reason, I like AIRV, because its option of 
> approval-like voting (voting Compromise in 1st place along with 
> Favorite) makes things easier for non-MM voters.
>  Could you give an example of the use of AIRV's pushover strategy?
> Mike