[EM] New Criterion
fsimmons at pcc.edu
Tue May 20 16:28:49 PDT 2014
Yes, you have succinctly summarized the intent of the criterion. Now it
remains to be seen which methods (if any) comply.
I have a feeling that both of Benham's methods comply, and perhaps even an
equal ranking version of IRV, at least in the case of three candidates, but
so far no general proof.
Some random simulations would be nice, but finding the Nash equilibria
automatically might be challenging.
On Tue, May 20, 2014 at 8:31 AM, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>wrote:
> Then, with a complying method, it's always possible to get, without using
> revesal, a result that's a Nash equilibrium, and--as the MAM winner--is an
> ideal majoritarian result.
> So,even though, to meet CD, it's necessary to give up SDSC and SFC, a
> group of voters can, without reversal, achieve, at equilibrium ,an ideal
> majoritarian result.
> Michael Ossipoff
> On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:
>> Chris and Mike,
>> your combined comments gave me an idea for a more practical version of
>> A method satisfies Semi-Sincerity Relative to MAM or SS(MAM) if and only
>> if a semi-sincere modification of the sincere preferences leads to a
>> strategic equilibrium ballot set from which the method elects the the
>> sincere MAM winner.
>> This criterion recognizes the superiority of MAM under ideal conditions
>> while allowing the method in question to comply with CD, for example.
>> Suppose our method is Benham, and sincere votes are
>> 34 A>B
>> 31 B
>> 35 C
>> A semi-sincere ballot modification results in a Nash equilibrium for
>> Benham that elects B, the MAM winner of the sincere ballot set (not to
>> mention the modified set).
>> 34 A=B
>> 31 B
>> 35 C
>> Date: Sun, 18 May 2014 14:46:30 -0400
>>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>>> To: cbenham at adam.com.au, "election-methods at electorama.com"
>>> <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>> Subject: Re: [EM] New Criterion
>>> CAOKDY5DYQZtEnaoxoV8NG3OxyFBsw+59x2vpZU8maFZZEuJiqA at mail.gmail.com>
>>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>>> One comment that I can make right away is that FBC is almost surely
>>> incompatible with CD + MMC. ...just as FBC is incompatible with
>>> So, in Green scenario or ideal majoritarian conditions, FBC would be too
>>> costly. So, if the 2nd of Forest's criteria, too, is incompatible with
>>> criteria desirable for the Green scenario, that's favorable to a likening
>>> of that criterion to FBC. Sure, the differences are great too..
>>> Of course you have a point about the desirability of sacrificing one's
>>> favorite in order to save the winner under sincere voting.
>>> It could be argued that the thing being measured for is the _possibiity_
>>> easily (without reversal) preserving the sincere winner, whether or not
>>> it's always desirable, and that that's a matter of interest, just because
>>> it _could_ be desirable.
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