[EM] New Criterion
email9648742 at gmail.com
Tue May 20 08:31:59 PDT 2014
Then, with a complying method, it's always possible to get, without using
revesal, a result that's a Nash equilibrium, and--as the MAM winner--is an
ideal majoritarian result.
So,even though, to meet CD, it's necessary to give up SDSC and SFC, a group
of voters can, without reversal, achieve, at equilibrium ,an ideal
On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> wrote:
> Chris and Mike,
> your combined comments gave me an idea for a more practical version of
> A method satisfies Semi-Sincerity Relative to MAM or SS(MAM) if and only
> if a semi-sincere modification of the sincere preferences leads to a
> strategic equilibrium ballot set from which the method elects the the
> sincere MAM winner.
> This criterion recognizes the superiority of MAM under ideal conditions
> while allowing the method in question to comply with CD, for example.
> Suppose our method is Benham, and sincere votes are
> 34 A>B
> 31 B
> 35 C
> A semi-sincere ballot modification results in a Nash equilibrium for
> Benham that elects B, the MAM winner of the sincere ballot set (not to
> mention the modified set).
> 34 A=B
> 31 B
> 35 C
> Date: Sun, 18 May 2014 14:46:30 -0400
>> From: Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com>
>> To: cbenham at adam.com.au, "election-methods at electorama.com"
>> <election-methods at electorama.com>
>> Subject: Re: [EM] New Criterion
>> CAOKDY5DYQZtEnaoxoV8NG3OxyFBsw+59x2vpZU8maFZZEuJiqA at mail.gmail.com>
>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>> One comment that I can make right away is that FBC is almost surely
>> incompatible with CD + MMC. ...just as FBC is incompatible with
>> So, in Green scenario or ideal majoritarian conditions, FBC would be too
>> costly. So, if the 2nd of Forest's criteria, too, is incompatible with the
>> criteria desirable for the Green scenario, that's favorable to a likening
>> of that criterion to FBC. Sure, the differences are great too..
>> Of course you have a point about the desirability of sacrificing one's
>> favorite in order to save the winner under sincere voting.
>> It could be argued that the thing being measured for is the _possibiity_
>> easily (without reversal) preserving the sincere winner, whether or not
>> it's always desirable, and that that's a matter of interest, just because
>> it _could_ be desirable.
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