[EM] Voting System - Wiki

[Juho Laatu]

On 19 May 2014, at 18:28, Michael Ossipoff <email9648742 at gmail.com> wrote:

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> Juho:
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> You wrote:
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> I'd be happier if the analysis on his list would more frequently point out which claims are intended to work or be important in public elections and when we are talking about some entirely different environments. Both / all approaches are needed but it would make sense to put more emphasis also on which vulnerabilities and strategies are relevant in typical real life (political) elections.
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>  
> [endquote]
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> That's what I've  been doing. Not only have I specifed methods for official public political elections, but I've distinguished between various kinds of conditions for those official public political elections:

Good.

>  
> 1. Current conditions

"Current" might refer to the U.S. It would be good to point out clearly where the recommendations apply (e.g. to improve presidenial elections of certain type, in single winner districts of legislative bodies etc.)

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> ...Recommended: Approval, Score, ICT
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> 2. Green scenario
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> ...Recommended: IRV, Benham, Woodall
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> 3. Ideal majoritarian conditions
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> ...Recommended: MAM
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> ---------------------------------------
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> Current conditions need FBC. Green scenario conditions (in which a progressive party has been elected to office) call for MMC and CD, with the Condorcet Criterion a desirable bonus. That combination is possible because FBC isn't needed.

This sounds a bit like using different methods based on the current political situation. Typically one has to use one method that works well enough in all possible situations.

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> In ideal majoritarian conditions, CD isn't needed either (in addition to FBC not being needed0. Ideal majoritarian conditions exist in polls, and among amicable organizations, groups, families and committees.
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> In inimical groups, CD-complying methods are desirable.
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> Approval is a uniquely easily-counted method whose versatility makes it ok for all conditions, though it's suboptimal in Green scenario and ideal majoritarian conditions. Approval is near optimal under current conditions, though ICT is better (but not as easy to propose).
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> Check out my articles at Democracy Chronicles, regarding voting systems for the various kinds of conditions.
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> http:/www.democracychronicles.com
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> Click on authors, to find my articles there.

I can see plenty of research stuff there, as expected since I know that you often do produce a lot of EM related material. For the purposs of DNOW1 I guess it would be most beneficial if EM list could find some consensus with good arguments on why everyone (or clear majority) agrees on the usefulness of some methods for certain needs. That would be sort of "wiki level" material that could be very useful.

To DNOW1 I want to mention the fact that in the EM list there are many people with many kind of opinions. It is not always easy to find a consensus among the members of the list, but often there are smaller groups that agree on some topcis that are close to their thinking. I'd be happy if the list would be able to find true stable consensus on some key voting topics more often. But on the other hand also the "rich" nature of this discussion group and the multitude of different viewpoints to the numerous topics makes this list a very enriching environment. Little bit too little consensus though, and little bit too much personal missions and strong opinions on what is absolutely right and what is absolutely wrong. I'd be happy to see also some strong "wiki level" consensus material emerging here (on practical elections related matters as well as on some purely theoretical results).

Juho


>  
> Michael Ossipoff
>  
>  
> ----
> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

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