[EM] Concerning Chicken Proof Smith compliant methods

[Michael Ossipoff]

Forest--

You wrote:



>
> In summary, if sincere preferences are
>
> x: A>C
> y: B>C
> z: C>A,
>
> then rational ballots will be
>
> x: A>C
> y: B=C
> z: C>B
>
>

Didn't you mean z: C>A?    ...with the C-preferrers ranking sincerely,
rather than burying A?

...though C would be the voted CW either way. But  z: C>A is sincere, and,
as you said, it's part of the equilibrium ballot-set that's closest to the
sincere preferences.

No one has a majoriiy, and the A-preferrers are the voters in best position
to attempt offensive strategy, if anyone can, because they're the biggest
faction, and because their candidate is 2nd choice of the CW's faction.

Michael Ossipoff
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