[EM] Concerning Chicken Proof Smith compliant methods

[Forest Simmons]

Yes, that was supposed to by C>A.  I'm glad someone is proofreading this
for me!


On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 10:41 AM, Michael Ossipoff
<email9648742 at gmail.com>wrote:

>
> Forest--
>
> You wrote:
>
>
>
>>
>> In summary, if sincere preferences are
>>
>> x: A>C
>> y: B>C
>> z: C>A,
>>
>> then rational ballots will be
>>
>> x: A>C
>> y: B=C
>> z: C>B
>>
>>
> Yes, C>A.


> Didn't you mean z: C>A?    ...with the C-preferrers ranking sincerely,
> rather than burying A?
>
> ...though C would be the voted CW either way. But  z: C>A is sincere, and,
> as you said, it's part of the equilibrium ballot-set that's closest to the
> sincere preferences.
>
> No one has a majoriiy, and the A-preferrers are the voters in best
> position to attempt offensive strategy, if anyone can, because they're the
> biggest faction, and because their candidate is 2nd choice of the CW's
> faction.
>
> Michael Ossipoff
>
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