[EM] another lottery for the record

[Forest Simmons]

A subset K of candidates covers the set of candidates if every candidate
that is not in K is beaten pairwise by some member of K.

A covering set K is minimal if no set with fewer candidates covers the set
of candidates.

Here's our new method:

Let K be the minimal covering set with the greatest total approval (sum of
approval over candidates in K).

Put the names of the members of K on otherwise identical slips of paper,
and elect the candidate whose name is drawn at random.

I believe this method is monotone and clone free, and relatively strategy
free.  It certainly satisfies the Condorcet Criterion; whenever there is a
ballot CW the only possible minimal covering set is the one whose only
member is the CW.

In almost all of our other examples it would be a tossup between the top
two approval members of Smith.

Forest
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20140503/812b10cb/attachment-0003.htm>