[EM] Voter strategising ability

[Michael Ossipoff]

>
>
>
> what we want is a voting system that is safe, simple, allows expression,
> and rewards sincerity over strategy.  despite the protestations from the
> Score and Approval folks, i have never been persuaded by them that their
> solution beats the Ranked Ballot and a Condorcet compliant method to
> tabulate the ballots and determine the winner.
>
>
>
For curent conditions, Approval and Score beat Condorcet, because Approval
and Score meet FBC, and Condorcet fails FBC.

Based on the (dis)information available to voters under current conditions,
a progressive's optimal stratey is to vote the Democrat alone in 1st place.
That' uncontroversial. No one denies it.


For Green scenario concititions, IRV, Benham and Woodall beat the other
Condorcet methods, because IRV, Benham and Woodall meet Mutual Majority
(MMC) and CD, while the other Condorcet methdods fail CD.

All the popular Condorcet versions meet MMC and Condorcet, but those
compliances are rendered meaningless when there's a chicken-dilemma.

Michael Ossipoff
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20140714/ae328fc5/attachment.htm>