[EM] PR for ethnically polarized electorates

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 07/01/2014 12:19 AM, Forest Simmons wrote:
> If the voters don't want to strategize, then they just submit their
> range ballots (for the parties) directly.  Let R(i) represent range
> ballot R's rating of party i, and let S(i) be the social rating of party
> i, in other words the average value of R(i) over all R.
>
> Then the single vote of ballot R goes to the party i that maximizes the
> product R(i)*S(i).
>
> If the allowable range values are just zero and one, then this method
> reduces to Martin Harper's vote assignment scheme.

Won't that be susceptible to one-way strategy?

What I meant was, is there a method that can do what the strategic 
method does (given the negotiation data) but without any explicit 
negotiation data available? Something like DSV, although in this case, I 
suppose that the ballot with negotiation data (how much agreement you 
need to switch) is technically DSV.

Or perhaps there is something that is similarly strategy resistant in 
this situation as MJ is in ordinary elections wrt Range.