[EM] TACC (total approval chain climbing) example

[Kristofer Munsterhjelm]

On 04/21/2014 11:39 PM, C.Benham wrote:
> Forest,
>
>> 48 C
>> 27 A>B
>> 25 B
>
>> Borda, TACC, and IRV based methods like Woodall and Benham elect C.
>>
>> But Borda is clone dependent, and the IRV style elimination based
>> methods fail monotonicity.  So TACC is a leading contender if we
>> really take the Chicken Dilemma seriously.
>
> Benham and Woodall are a lot more resistant  to Burial than TACC (and
> other Condorcet methods that meet mono-raise, aka monotonicity) because
> they meet
> "Unburiable Mutual Dominant Third" that says that if a set S of
> candidates are all voted together on top of more than a third of the
> ballots (i.e. on more than a third of the ballots no other candidates
> are voted between or above them) and all the members of S pairwise beat
> all the non-member candidates, then the winner X must come from S  (so
> far the MDT criterion); and if some of the ballots that vote any Y above
> X are altered by further lowering X then if the winner is changed it
> can't be to Y.

Is UMDT incompatible with mono-raise? Without thinking too much about 
it, I'd expect some of the descending coalitions methods to pass it.

Is UMDT incompatible with {mono-raise + Condorcet}? If so, do you have a 
proof of this?