[EM] Approval Margins example

[Forest Simmons]

Chris,

just change 35 A>B to 35 A>>B, and C wins, unless the B faction gets wise
and changes to 25 B>>A or 25 B>A, making A the ballot CW.

The explicit approvals are C40>A35>B25, and since pairwise C beats A beats
B,  Condorect(approval) whether total approval or approval margins, elects
C.

MEA and Smith//Approval also elect C.

Your instincts were right to begin with!

Forest



Date: Tue, 29 Apr 2014 15:53:05 +0930
> From: "C.Benham" <cbenham at adam.com.au>
> To: em <election-methods at electorama.com>
> Subject: [EM] Correction: Approval Margins fails Chicken Dilemma
> Message-ID: <535F4549.8000908 at adam.com.au>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
>
>
> Oops!  I've just discovered that my recent claim that Approval Margins
> (and Approval Margins Sort)
> fails the CD criterion is wrong.   Sorry.
>
> 35 A>B
> 25 B
> 40 C
>
> B>C>A>B   Approvals: B60 > C40 > A35   (Approval Margins Sort elects B)
>
> Approval Margins: A>B -25,   B>C +20,  C>A +5.  B's defeat is the
> weakest so B wins.
>
> The combination of CD and Plurality  says that C must win.
>
>
>
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