[EM] A Chicken Proof, Monotonic Method

[Forest Simmons]

The following "chain climbing" method devised by Jobst Heitzig satisfies
the Chicken Dilemma criterion, is monotonic, clone proof, and elects only
uncovered candidates (in fact from the Banks set).

Initialize the set S of champions as the empty set.

Then while at least one candidate X is not beaten pairwise by any member of
S, from among such candidates take the one with the least implicit approval
and add it to S.

When the while loop is finished, elect the last candidate added to S, i.e.
the one that is not beaten pairwise by any other member of S.

Example:

49 C
24 B
27 A>B

The implicit approval order is A < C < B

The pairwise defeat cycle is A > B > C > A .

S is initialized as empty:  S = { }.

The least approval set is A, and a is not beaten pairwise by any member of
the empty set, so S is updated to  S = {A}.

Now the only candidate not beaten pairwise by any member of S is C, so s is
updated to S = {A, C} .

The only remaining candidate (outside of S) is B, which is beaten by a
member of S, so S cannot accept any additional members.

Since C was the last member added, the method elects C..
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