Jameson Quinn jameson.quinn at gmail.com
Sat Oct 26 13:29:51 PDT 2013

I like the relative simplicity of this method. It's also nice because it
has a clear relationship to Bucklin/median methods. It seems as though it
would do well against the chicken dilemma; though perhaps it would be even
better if it used pure MPO as a tie breaker.

I have two questions, then. What would you call it? And, how would you
count it in practice? Would you need to keep a full Condorcet matrix, or
are there tricks which would allow you to do a hand-count without that?

As to naming, here are some ideas:

   - Pairwise Opposition Bucklin
   - Instant Runoff Bucklin
   - Threshold Approval Minus Oppsition (TAMO)

2013/10/26 Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu>

> Here's an idea that is essentially a more seamless version of Chris
> Benham's IBIFA:
> Each voter rates each candidate on a scale of zero to some maximum
> allowable rating..
> Set the approval cutoff level at the highest level possible consistent
> with at least one candidate having at least as much approval as max
> pairwise opposition.
> Elect the candidate with the biggest difference between approval and max
> pairwise opposition.
> That's it.
> It turns out that if no other approval cutoff yields a candidate with as
> much approval as MPO, then setting the cutoff between zero and the next
> higher level (thereby yielding "Implicit Approval") will work.  In fact
> when approval is given by Implicit Approval, the candidate with the most
> approval is one candidate (but not necessarily the only one) that will have
> at least as much approval as MPO.
> This method satisfies the FBC and the mono-add-top version of
> Participation, etc.  It also solves the same problem of ordinary Approval
> and MAMPO that IBIFA was designed to solve, viz getting your Compromise out
> of the way when your Favorite has sufficient high level support.
> What do you think?
> On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 7:10 PM, Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>wrote:
>> Forest,
>> Another FBC-complying method (that I'd forgotten about) that I also like
>> a lot is
>> "ICT"  (as Mike O. renamed it).  It should only be used on 3-slot ratings
>> ballots.
>> It is just like Kevin V's  ICA  (Improved Condorcet//Approval) except if
>> there is
>> no "tied-at-the-top" rule pairwise beats-all candidate then instead of
>> electing the
>> most approved (rated Top or Middle) candidate we elect the most Top-rated
>> candidate.
>> http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica
>> Unlike  ICA, IBIFA, Shulze and other methods, it meets Mike O's  "Chicken
>> dilemma
>> criterion".
>> Chris
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