Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Sat Oct 26 11:44:59 PDT 2013

Here's an idea that is essentially a more seamless version of Chris
Benham's IBIFA:

Each voter rates each candidate on a scale of zero to some maximum
allowable rating..

Set the approval cutoff level at the highest level possible consistent with
at least one candidate having at least as much approval as max pairwise

Elect the candidate with the biggest difference between approval and max
pairwise opposition.

That's it.

It turns out that if no other approval cutoff yields a candidate with as
much approval as MPO, then setting the cutoff between zero and the next
higher level (thereby yielding "Implicit Approval") will work.  In fact
when approval is given by Implicit Approval, the candidate with the most
approval is one candidate (but not necessarily the only one) that will have
at least as much approval as MPO.

This method satisfies the FBC and the mono-add-top version of
Participation, etc.  It also solves the same problem of ordinary Approval
and MAMPO that IBIFA was designed to solve, viz getting your Compromise out
of the way when your Favorite has sufficient high level support.

What do you think?

On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 7:10 PM, Chris Benham <cbenhamau at yahoo.com.au>wrote:

> Forest,
> Another FBC-complying method (that I'd forgotten about) that I also like a
> lot is
> "ICT"  (as Mike O. renamed it).  It should only be used on 3-slot ratings
> ballots.
> It is just like Kevin V's  ICA  (Improved Condorcet//Approval) except if
> there is
> no "tied-at-the-top" rule pairwise beats-all candidate then instead of
> electing the
> most approved (rated Top or Middle) candidate we elect the most Top-rated
> candidate.
> http://nodesiege.tripod.com/elections/#methica
> Unlike  ICA, IBIFA, Shulze and other methods, it meets Mike O's  "Chicken
> dilemma
> criterion".
> Chris
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