[EM] Quotaless STV-PR suggestion

[Chris Benham]

On 07/02/2013 07:09 PM, Chris Benham wrote:

> I am sure this meets Droop Proportionality for Solid Coalitions.
 
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (3 July 2013):

"Does that mean that the method reduces to largest remainders Droop when 
the voters vote for all candidates of a single party each?"
 
Kristopher,
 
Yes.
 
STV meets Later-no-Harm because lower preferences only count after the
the fate (elected or definitely eliminated) of more preferred candidates has
been set.
 
My suggestion doesn't because by not truncating a voter could have their
ballot count towards the election of a non-favourite in an early round (and
a candidate that might have won anyway), and so be reduced in weight and
then not be "heavy" enough to elect the voter's favourite in a later round
(when it would have been if the voter had truncated).
 
Some STV fans might not like that, but I'm not fully on board with the LNHarm
religion. While I think a very strong truncation incentive is a bad thing, absolute
compliance with LNHarm makes it more likely that the result will (at least partly) be
determined by the weak, maybe ill-informed, preferences of voters who are only
really interested in their favourites (and certainly wouldn't have turned out if their
favourites weren't on the ballot); thereby reducing the  "Social Utility" of the full
set of winners (and maybe compromising the legitimacy of some of them).

I like IRV, but its compliance with LNHarm isn't IMO one of its best features.
 
Chris Benham
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