<html><body><div style="color:#000; background-color:#fff; font-family:verdana, helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12pt"><div>On 07/02/2013 07:09 PM, Chris Benham wrote:<br><br>> I am sure this meets Droop Proportionality for Solid Coalitions.</div><div><font face="Arial" size="2"></font> </div><div><font face="Arial" size="2">Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (3 July 2013):</font><br><br>"Does that mean that the method reduces to largest remainders Droop when <br>the voters vote for all candidates of a single party each?"</div><div> </div><div>Kristopher,</div><div> </div><div>Yes.</div><div> </div><div>STV meets Later-no-Harm because lower preferences only count after the</div><div>the fate (elected or definitely eliminated) of more preferred candidates has</div><div>been set.</div><div> </div><div>My suggestion doesn't because by not truncating a voter could have their</div><div>ballot count towards the election of a non-favourite
in an early round (and</div><div>a candidate that might have won anyway), and so be reduced in weight and</div><div>then not be "heavy" enough to elect the voter's favourite in a later round</div><div>(when it would have been if the voter had truncated).</div><div> </div><div>Some STV fans might not like that, but I'm not fully on board with the LNHarm</div><div>religion. While I think a very strong truncation incentive is a bad thing, absolute<br>compliance with LNHarm makes it more likely that the result will (at least partly) be<br>determined by the weak, maybe ill-informed, preferences of voters who are only</div><div>really interested in their favourites (and certainly wouldn't have turned out if their</div><div>favourites weren't on the ballot); thereby reducing the "Social Utility" of the full</div><div>set of winners (and maybe compromising the legitimacy of some of them).</div><div><br><var id="yui-ie-cursor"></var>I
like IRV, but its compliance with LNHarm isn't IMO one of its best features.</div><div> </div><div>Chris Benham</div><div> </div><div> </div> </div></body></html>