[EM] Consensus threshold

[Forest Simmons]

Good Points!

On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 at 12:16 AM, Michael Allan <mike at zelea.com> wrote:

> > The psychological value of this method is that it appeals to our
> > natural community spirit which includes a willingness to go along
> > with the group consensus when the consensus is strong enough, as
> > long as there is no hope for a better consensus, and as long as it
> > isn't a candidate that we would rate at zero.
> >
> > Comments?
>
> I think there is a general williness to *consider* a consensus, but
> not a general willingness to follow it blindly.  The popularity of a
> candidate is a recommendation to look more closely at that candidate
> given the fact of his/her popularity.  Here popularity directly serves
> only to arouse my curiosity, "Why is this candidate more popular?
> What do others know that I don't know?"
>
> On learning the answer, I decide whether to follow the consensus.
>
> The proposed method differs in asking me to make the same decision,
> but without knowing the reason for the candidate's popularity.  It
> invites me to act irrationally and enshrines that action as normal
> human behaviour.
>
> As a counter-proposal, consider a broader rationalization of the
> electoral design.  Rather than overloading a single election with
> expectations it cannot fulfil, factor it into two elections: (1) a
> continuous, advisory primary to flush out consensus and dissensus, to
> give people time to talk things over, and decide what to do; followed
> by (2) a decisive election in which they express the decision.  This
> solves the problem of systematic irrationality by allowing for a real
> consensus in the primary, one with reasons behind it, the validity of
> which can be discussed and debated before making a decision.
>
> --
> Michael Allan
>
> Toronto, +1 416-699-9528
> http://zelea.com/
>
>
> Forest Simmons said:
> > Jobst has suggested that ballots be used to elicit voter's "consensus
> > thresholds" for the various candidates.
> >
> > If your consensus threshold for candidate X is 80 percent, that means
> that
> > you would be willing to support candidate X if more than 80 percent of
> the
> > other voters were also willing to support candidate X, but would forbid
> > your vote from counting towards the election of X if the total support
> for
> > X would end up short of 80 percent.
> >
> > The higher the threshold that you give to X the more reluctant you are to
> > join in a consensus, but as long as your threshold t for X is less than
> > than 100 percent, a sufficiently large consensus (i.e. larger than t
> > percent) would garner your support, as long as it it is the largest
> > consensus that qualifies for your support.
> >
> > A threshold of zero signifies that you are willing to support X no matter
> > how small the consensus, as long as no larger consensus qualifies for
> your
> > support.
> >
> > I suggest that we use score ballots on a scale of 0 to 100 with the
> > convention that the score and the threshold for a candidate are related
> by
> > s+t=100.
> >
> > So given the score ballots, here's how the method is counted:
> >
> > For each candidate X let p(X) be the largest number p between 0 and 100
> > such that p(X) ballots award a score strictly greater than 100-p to
> > candidate X.
> >
> > The candidate X with the largest value of p(X) wins the election.
> >
> > If there are two or more candidates that share this maximum value of p,
> > then choose from the tied set the candidate ranked the highest in the
> > following order:
> >
> > Candidate X precedes candidate Y if X is scored above zero on more
> ballots
> > than Y.  If this doesn't break the tie, then X precedes Y if X is scored
> > above one on more ballots than Y.  If that still doesn't break the tie,
> > then X precedes Y if X is scored above two on more ballots than Y, etc.
> >
> > In the unlikely event that the tie isn't broken before you get to 100,
> > choose the winner from the remaining tied candidates by random ballot.
> >
> > The psychological value of this method is that it appeals to our natural
> > community spirit which includes a willingness to go along with the group
> > consensus when the consensus is strong enough, as long as there is no
> hope
> > for a better consensus, and as long as it isn't a candidate that we would
> > rate at zero.
> >
> > Comments?
> >
> > Forest
>
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