[EM] Let's clear up some confusion

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Thu, Oct 4, 2012 at 3:24 PM, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> On 4.10.2012, at 16.18, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> You said:
>>
>> Maybe you don't worry about recommending voters to turn strategic in
>> Condorcet elections since you don't like (or trust) Condorcet methods
>> very much anyway.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> That isn't true. Symmetrical iCT is a Condorcet method, and I like and
>> trust Symmetrical ICT.
>
> I think you recommended Symmetrical ICT for informational polling. I guess you like and trust it within that framework.

I like and trust Symmetrical ICT within every framework.

In official public elections, I like and trust Symmetrical ICT.

What I don't trust, in official public elections is the people who own
and operate the machines that do the machine balloting, and the
computerized counting. That's the "trust" reason why I don't propose
any rank-balloting method for official public elections.

>> You said:
>>
>> I guess we'll just have to wait and see. There are many TTR and IRV
>> elections where people generally vote sincerely, but one never knows.
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> One can listen to what voters say. Where IRV is used for official
>> public elections, voters say that they favorite-bury, so as to not
>> waste their vote.
>
> References?

We've heard reports about that on EM, more than once. I didn't write
down the people's names. If I'd written down their names, you'd be
able to call them. I definitely wouldn't be able to write that in the
junior-journal, because I can't cite the sources.

>> We've already made a pact: I won't tell you the strategy-inclinations
>> of voters where you reside, and you won't tell me the
>> strategy-inclinations in the U.S.
>
> What was that?



You're right.: I said, "I won't tell you how Finnish voters think, if
you won't tell me how American voters think", but you never agreed to
that.

Ok, so we don't have such an agreement. Ok, then keep telling us all
about the psychology and motivations of American voters. :-)

>>> More seriously, my point is still that the best promise of Condorcet methods is that people might be able to give full sincere rankings in competitive >elections.
>>
>> Yes, the promise of Symmetrical ICT is that it encourages sincere
>> ranking, unlike unimproved Condorcet.
>

You said:

I believe you recommended voters to be sincere in one (not so
competitive) election.

[endquote]

Yes, I recommended top-end sincerity in an informational poll.

You said:

In the previous mail you said "I'd emphasize that their best strategy
in a u/a election is to equal top rank all of the acceptables, and to
not rank any accceptables." Maybe you think that this is the best
level of sincerity that Condorcet methods can achieve.

[endquote]

It's the the optimal u/a strategy with the best Condorcet method
(Symmetrical ICT)

If the method is unimproved Condorcet ("Strong Condorcet"), then all
bets are off. You won't know what to do, even in a u/a election.
You'll still have the need to top-rank the acceptables, but, in
unimproved Condorcet, there will be a risk penalty when you do that,
and you won't know what to do. Don't ask me to advise you on how to
vote in an unimproved Condorcet u/a election. You'll have a
strategy-dilemma, and you'll have to just hope that you guess well.



>
>> We've agreed to disagree
>> about which one of us has more familiarity with and contact with
>> American voters.
>
> I disagree. :-)

Do you mean that you disagree, in keeping with our agreement to
disagree, or do you mean that you don't agree that you agreed to
disagree.

If it is the latter, then do you disagree that you agree to disagree
because you agree?

If so, then you agree with me about which one of us has more
familiarity and contact with American voters.

Mike Ossipoff