[EM] Let's clear up some confusion

[Juho Laatu]

On 4.10.2012, at 16.18, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> You said:
> 
> Maybe you don't worry about recommending voters to turn strategic in
> Condorcet elections since you don't like (or trust) Condorcet methods
> very much anyway.
> 
> [endquote]
> 
> That isn't true. Symmetrical iCT is a Condorcet method, and I like and
> trust Symmetrical ICT.

I think you recommended Symmetrical ICT for informational polling. I guess you like and trust it within that framework.

> You said:
> 
> I think that a considerable part of the benefits of ranked methods
> would be lost if people would have to resort to strategic voting, and
> not indicate sincerely which candidates are good.
> 
> [endquote]
> 
> Good point. So then, you're therefore changing your proposal from
> margins to Approval, right?

Probably not, unless you manage to arrange some Condorcet elections and spread the message of strategic voting well enough. Hopefuly also Approval elections and good propaganda in the reverse direction. :-)

> You said:
> 
> I guess we'll just have to wait and see. There are many TTR and IRV
> elections where people generally vote sincerely, but one never knows.
> 
> [endquote]
> 
> One can listen to what voters say. Where IRV is used for official
> public elections, voters say that they favorite-bury, so as to not
> waste their vote.

References?

> We've already made a pact: I won't tell you the strategy-inclinations
> of voters where you reside, and you won't tell me the
> strategy-inclinations in the U.S.

What was that?

>> More seriously, my point is still that the best promise of Condorcet methods is that people might be able to give full sincere rankings in competitive >elections.
> 
> Yes, the promise of Symmetrical ICT is that it encourages sincere
> ranking, unlike unimproved Condorcet.

I believe you recommended voters to be sincere in one (not so competitive) election. In the previous mail you said "I'd emphasize that their best strategy in a u/a election is to equal top rank all of the acceptables, and to not rank any accceptables." Maybe you think that this is the best level of sincerity that Condorcet methods can achieve.

> We've agreed to disagree
> about which one of us has more familiarity with and contact with
> American voters.

I disagree. :-)

Juho