[EM] Let's clear up some confusion

[Michael Ossipoff]

On Thu, Oct 4, 2012 at 4:01 AM, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> On 4.10.2012, at 7.49, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>
>> You said:
>>
>> , maybe the question if you recommend the voters to rank sincerely or
>> if you recommend them to sometimes use the top ties (although the
>> candidates are not equally good).
>>
>> [endquote]
>>
>> Good question. In a public election, I'd emphasize that their best
>> strategy in a u/a election is to equal top rank all of the
>> acceptables, and to not rank any accceptables.
>
> Ok, this is maybe where our thoughts differ. My target level with ranked methods is to be able to tell the voters that there indeed are some strategic possibilities, at least theoretical ones, but for them it is safe enough and their best general strategy to rank the candidates sincerely. I don't like the idea of recommending voters not to give their opinion about the candidates. Not giving one's sincere opinions may introduce more problems than it solves.

[endquote]

As I said, when I introduced the ITC rank-balloting poll at Democracy
Chronicles, I asked people to rank sincerely, at top-end, to gain
better preference information, to find the CW.

That doesn't mean that I would lie to people about what their best
strategy is, as you seem to be saying you would do.

And yes, strategy, when based on false information, can indeed cause
problems. But that doesn't mean we lie to voters about what their best
strategy is. For example, though I'd disclose a rank method's u/a
strategy, I'd also argue that Democrats aren't acceptable, and tell
why they're identical to Republicans. But you're right: Badly-informed
strategy isn't good.


>And it certainly makes the outcome of the election worse in the case that there was after all no need to vote strategically.

We encounter, every few years, the results of misinformed strategy. It
can happen with any method. But if you tried to lie to people about
the voting system's strategy, you'd be found out. You couldn't get
away with it. The interests who benefit from the misinformed strategy
would point out your deception, and then you wouldn't have any
credibility when challenging the misinformation about
candidate-acceptability or faction-size numbers.
The best policy: Admit what the best strategy genuinely is, but put
out some accurate information on which for people to base their
strategy--because voters here are very strategy-inclined.

>
You said:

Maybe you don't worry about recommending voters to turn strategic in
Condorcet elections since you don't like (or trust) Condorcet methods
very much anyway.

[endquote]

That isn't true. Symmetrical iCT is a Condorcet method, and I like and
trust Symmetrical ICT. I just don't like and trust the people who own
the vote-counting machines, which is why I'd greatly prefer a method
that doesn't rely on machine balloting and computerized counting.

My other objections to all Condorcet methods are about enactability,
given rank-advocates' complete inability to agree on a proposal, and
given the embarrassing failures of Participation and Consistency, of
all Condorcet methods.

I think that a good Condorcet method (Symmetrical ICT) would be very
useful for informational polling.





You said:

I think that a considerable part of the benefits of ranked methods
would be lost if people would have to resort to strategic voting, and
not indicate sincerely which candidates are good.

[endquote]

Good point. So then, you're therefore changing your proposal from
margins to Approval, right?

You get maximal simplicity, brevity, count-security and ease. And
Participation and Consistency in the bargain. Not to mention Plurality
compliance.

We'll sign you up.

You said:

Maybe your answer is that Condorcet methods are so vulnerable to
strategies that the voters must either vote strategically or fall prey
to the .strategists.

[endquote]

"Vulnerability" refers to offensive strategies. No, Symmetrical ICT, a
Condorcet method, isn't vulnerable to offensive strategy. It's
top-count completion pretty much eliminates burial incentive, and
makes successful burial much less likely. I've made it clear why I
don't propose Symmetrical ICT for official public elections. It has
nothing to do with vulnerability to offensive strategy. In fact,it has
nothing to do with strategy at all.

...unless you're referring to the strategy of enactment opponents when
they try to confuse voters with the large array of possible
rank-counts, or when they predictably cite Participation and
Consistency failure during an enactment campaign. ...or the
count-fraud strategy of the owners of machine counting equipment.

But if, when you say "Condorcet methods", you are referring to _its_
vulnerability to offensive strategy, then yes, that would be a
problem. Unimproved Condorcet has a genuine vulnerability to burial
strategy. And margins Condorcet is even vulnerable to offensive
truncation.

But, even with unimproved Condorcet, the worst strategy problem
results from FBC failure. That has nothing to do with vulnerability to
offensive strategy.

You said:

I guess we'll just have to wait and see. There are many TTR and IRV
elections where people generally vote sincerely, but one never knows.

[endquote]

One can listen to what voters say. Where IRV is used for official
public elections, voters say that they favorite-bury, so as to not
waste their vote.

You said:

Of course this depends to some extent also on the society in question.

[endquote]

Yes, and my voting system recommendations are for the U.S.


>> in the unimproved Condorcet versions, you'd never really
>> know what to do. You'd have to try to judge whether some acceptables
>> are much more winnable than others, so that refusing to top-rank Y (an
>> acceptable) is justified because Y isn't likely to win anyway, and
>> top-ranking hir could make X (another acceptable) lose.
>>
>> That's a problem that you'd never have to worry about in Symmetrical
>> ICT. It's the old lesser-evil dilemma of FBC-failing methods.
>
> As I said, to me the most interesting strategic thinking related question in Condorcet is if one can honestly recommend sincere voting as the best >general strategy to the voters.

The answer is "No", you can't.  Remember Gibbard & Satterthwiate?

You said:

In Symmetrical ICT, with your advice to the voters, voters would have
to worry whether to tell that their favourite is better than the
compromise or if they should vote for a tie (and not support their
favourite over the compromise).

With any Condorcet method, probably with any rank method, if the
election isn't u/a, it wouldn't be obvious whether to equal-top-rank a
compromise. But, if the election is u/a, then Symmetrical ICT's
strategy is as simple, easy and obvious as that of Approval. The
difference, as I said, is that, with unimproved Condorcet, you won't
know what to do, even in a u/a election. You'll suffer strategy
dilemma even in a u/a election.

We've already made a pact: I won't tell you the strategy-inclinations
of voters where you reside, and you won't tell me the
strategy-inclinations in the U.S.



>> You might say that Symmetrical ICT's u/a strategy sounds a lot like
>> Approval. Yes, and the fact that the best that you can get, in u/a
>> strategy, in rank methods, is simply Approval strategy  is another
>> good reason to propose Approval (or maybe Score) instead of any rank
>> method.
>
> Maybe you promote Symmetrical ICT because that helps you promoting Approval over the Condorcet methods

I've many times made it clear that I don't promote any rank method for
official public elections. I've also many times made it clear why.

I advocate Symmetrical ICT for informational polling. Likewise, many
times I've explained why.

You said:

 i.e. that there is a need to flatten your preferences to the level of
Approval anyway. :-)

[endquote]

No, I'm not going to say anything insulting. I am not going to do
namecalling, with the pejorative "i..." word.

There is a need to "flatten your preferences" in unimproved Condorcet
too, by ranking the Democrat in 1st place, if you believe that s/he is
the only candidate who can beat the Republican, and that the
Republican, but not the Democrat, is unacceptable. But, in a way
you're right, because, with unimproved Condorcet, there is need to do
other than "flatten preferences": There's a need to vote the Green
below the Democrat even though you prefer the Green to the Democrat.

So yes, in that way, unimproved Condorcet can be said to take away the
need to flatten your preferences, when it makes you rank your favorite
below your compromise, instead of equal to it. :-)

You said:

> More seriously, my point is still that the best promise of Condorcet methods is that people might be able to give full sincere rankings in competitive >elections.

Yes, the promise of Symmetrical ICT is that it encourages sincere
ranking, unlike unimproved Condorcet.

You're right: Symmetrical ICT, more than any other rank method,
delivers on the promise of rank balloting.

But, if you're referring to unimproved, Condorcet, the answer is "No".
But we've been over that already, and we agreed to disagree about the
strategic inclinations of American voters. We've agreed to disagree
about which one of us has more familiarity with and contact with
American voters.

You said:

And that (e.g.) FBC properties of some traditional Condorcet methods
may be good enough to allow voters to vote sincerely.

[endquote]

You're right again: Hope that favorite-burial won't be a problem in
U.S. unimproved Condorcet elections depends on speculation.

But we've been all over that subject, and we agreed to disagree about
which one of us has more familiarity and contact with American voters.

You said:

Maybe you think the same way, except that for you the line of defence
is at the level of Approval.

[endquote]

No, favorite-burial wouldn't be a problem in Symmetrical iCT either.
Approval isn't the only FBC  complying method.

Symmetrical ICT would be fine for official public elections, if the
count were reliable, and if the voters understood or accepted that
there is no need tor favorite-burial. But that absence of any
favorite-burial need is more obvious in Approval. I've convinced
people that Approval won't have favorite-burial need. But, because
nothing matches Approval's simplicity, I don't know if I'd have been
able to convince them, regarding SICT's FBC compliance.

Mike Ossipoff