[EM] What happens when Approval doesn't let you vote Favorite>Dem>Repub?

[Juho Laatu]

On 29.5.2012, at 3.05, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> And Approval doesn't share Condorcet's favorite-burial incentive problem.

All Condorcet methods fail the FBC criterion. But in practice situations where the related burial strategy would be easy to use successfully or defensive burial would be really needed are rare (possibly not even relevant in typical real life elections). In Approval it is quite common that you have to "betray" your favourite to the level of its competitors (but not below). Approval may thus well involve more "favourite betraying" (in a wider meaning than what FBC uses) than Condorcet methods.

> And Condorcet shares Approval's C/D problem.

Approval is quite clueless when there are more than two potential winners. Voters have to guess which important preference they should indicate and which one they should falsify and claim to be a tie. In Condorcet we are again talking about cases that may be very marginal. In Condorcet sincere ranking (indication of all preferences) is a good strategy.

> Therefore your assumption that the Republocrats are all that's viable won't
> hold up long in Approval.

I don't assume that. Sooner or later some of the former minor parties/candidates are likely to grow, and there will be more than two potential winners. There may however be some tendency to stick to the old major parties in the system that you proposed (where Approval is used in single-member districts to elect representative bodies) since those old parties may still be the most influential ones in the political system of the U.S. for a long time.

> The "problem" that you speak of, in
> which people have the preferences Green>Democrat>Republican will vanish when
> it becomes obvious that he Republocrats aren't as popular as the media have
> been claiming. The Republican threat will no longer be taken seriously, and
> the idea of a need to support  the nearly-identical Democrat, to protect
> from the Republican, will be seen as hilarious.

In many political systems that use Plurality, IRV or TTR voters are quite unaware of the problems of the methods and better alternative methods, and therefore they do not care much about the problems. I however assume that in Approval the strategic problems with more than two serious potential winners would raise some concern. People might be "hilarious" after the Republican is no longer a threat, but maybe confused while any of the three might still win.

Juho