[EM] What happens when Approval doesn't let you vote Favorite>Dem>Repub?

[Michael Ossipoff]

> On 29.5.2012, at 3.05, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
> 
> > And Approval doesn't share Condorcet's favorite-burial incentive
problem.
> 
> All Condorcet methods fail the FBC criterion. But in practice situations
where the
> related burial strategy would be easy to use successfully or defensive
burial
> would be really needed are rare

Irrelevant, even if true. I've repeated many times for you my observations
and conversations with Democrat lesser-evil voters. No, I'm not going to
repeat it again for you. So since you've forgotten about it, then just take
my word for it that the available evidence indicates that favorite-burial
will be rampant in Condorcet.

 >(possibly not even relevant in typical real life)

Causing people to favorite-bury makes it relevant.

> elections). In Approval it is quite common that you have to "betray" your
> favourite to the level of its competitors (but not below). 

That's your new definition of "burial" :-)

>Approval may thus well
> involve more "favourite betraying" (in a wider meaning than what FBC uses)

In a modified meaning that you've come up with ad hoc, to try to make
Approval sound as bad as Condorcet.


>than
> Condorcet methods.

In Approval, no one has any reason to not top-rate their favorite(s). That
isn't true of Condorcet.

> 
> > And Condorcet shares Approval's C/D problem.
> 
> Approval is quite clueless when there are more than two potential winners.

I've just finished explaining to you that the goal of single-winner reform
assumes that there will be more than two potential winners.

Evidently you're too clueless to be aware that I just finished explaining
that to you.

You'd need to define "cluelessness" as an attribute of a voting system. 

Ok, that does it. This is my last reply to you, at least on this issue. I'm
not wasting any more time on you.

I'll finish this reply, and then that's it.

To anyone else:

My subsequent non-reply to Juho doesn't mean that he's said something
irrefutable. It just means that I finally decided to stop wasting my time by
repeating answers to his repeated arguments.

> Voters have to guess which important preference they should indicate and
which
> one they should falsify and claim to be a tie. 

Juho is all confused about what "falsify" means. To falsify a preference is
to vote a preference that isn't really a preference of yours. Condorcet, but
not Approval, gives incentive to falsify  one or more preferences.

I've repeated for you, many time, some suggestions for voting in Approval.
Those suggestions included expectation-maximizing strategies. No, I won't
repeat them again for you.


In Condorcet we are again talking
> about cases that may be very marginal. 

Juho neglected to define marginal. "Marginal" might not mean much, when
describing a strategy that will be widely used.


Juho says:

>In Condorcet sincere ranking (indication
> of all preferences) is a good strategy.

Only in 0-info, non-u/a elections. 

We've already discussed this. If you've forgotten, it isn't my
responsibility to discuss it again with you.


> > Therefore your assumption that the Republocrats are all that's viable
> > won't hold up long in Approval.
> 
> I don't assume that. Sooner or later some of the former minor
> parties/candidates are likely to grow, and there will be more than two
potential
> winners. There may however be some tendency to stick to the old major
parties
> in the system that you proposed (where Approval is used in single-member
> districts to elect representative bodies) since those old parties may
still be the
> most influential ones in the political system of the U.S. for a long time.

Dream on, Juho.

Juho is saying that the Republicans and Democrats will remain influential
because they'll remain influential.

Juho neglects to explain why or how they'll remain influential when (for
reasons that I've amply described) more liked platforms and proposals are
well-known, and the high support numbers for those platforms are well-known.


Juho is engaging in wishful thinking.
 
> > The "problem" that you speak of, in
> > which people have the preferences Green>Democrat>Republican will
> > vanish when it becomes obvious that he Republocrats aren't as popular
> > as the media have been claiming. The Republican threat will no longer
> > be taken seriously, and the idea of a need to support  the
> > nearly-identical Democrat, to protect from the Republican, will be seen
as
> >hilarious.
> 
> In many political systems that use Plurality, IRV or TTR voters are quite
unaware
> of the problems of the methods and better alternative methods, and
therefore
> they do not care much about the problems. 

On the contrary, voters in Plurality countries know and care about
Plurality's favorite-burial need. The care enough about it to always bury
their favorite.


> I however assume that in Approval
> the strategic problems with more than two serious potential winners would
raise
> some concern. People might be "hilarious" after the Republican is no
longer a
> threat

No no what I said was that the notion of the Republican being a threat will
be seen as hilarious.


>, but maybe confused while any of the three might still win.

Typically, it isn't known who will win. But I've provided suggestions,
including strategic suggestions, for voting in Approval.

And, more recently I've specifically looked at strategy considerations with
Progressives, Dems and Repubs.

As I said, this is my last reply to Juho on this issue.

My non-reply won't mean that Juho has said something irrefutable. It will
merely mean that I'm not longer wasting my time repeating things for him.

Mike Ossipoff