[EM] What happens when Approval doesn't let you vote Favorite>Dem>Repub?

[Dave Ketchum]

On May 28, 2012, at 8:05 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>> On 27.5.2012, at 22.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>>> You know, that's the Condorcetists' and IRVists' objection to  
>>> Approval.
>>
>> The question is what happens when Approval doesn't let you vote  
>> A>B>C. The
>> difference is that there is no division to minor and major  
>> candidates. The
> worst
>> Approval problems appear when there are three or more potential  
>> winners.
>
> The differences between the methods appear when there are more than  
> 2 viable
> candidates. It's for that situation that we want a better voting  
> system. The
> assumption in all of this discussion is that there are more than 2  
> potential
> winners.

There can be 2, or even 1, viable candidates - but our only concern is  
that we don't, somehow, make this be more of a problem than it needs  
to be.
>
>
> What you call "Approval's problems" are only a nuisance. Sometimes  
> not even
> that. That nuisance needs to be kept in perspective, in comparison to
> Plurality's problems.
>
> And Approval doesn't share Condorcet's favorite-burial incentive  
> problem.
> And Condorcet shares Approval's C/D problem.
>
>>> after the 1st Approval election, in which the non-Republocrat  
>>> parties
>>> and candidates have somehow managed to make at least some people  
>>> aware
>>> of their different platforms, policies and proposals, the count
>>> results are going to show many more votes for non-Republocrats, now
>>> that everyone, for the first time, has the freedom to rate anyone as
>>> they themselves choose to, and no longer constrained by the
>>> lesser-of-2-evils problem.
>>
>> The first Approval elections in a former two-party system could go  
>> really
> well if
>> we assume that the third parties won't be potential winners yet.
>
> In the first Approval election, that may very well be assumed by the
> lesser-evil Democrat voter. So s/he'll approve the Democrat. But s/ 
> he'll
> additionally approve everyone whom s/he likes more. The resulting  
> count
> result will therefore more accurately show who is liked and what is  
> wanted.

Always there can be such as a "lesser-evil Democrat" candidate who  
must be voted for in defense against the greater-evil potential  
winner.  Additionally approving all liked more goes with this.
.    What voters soon see is that, while liking these more, Approval  
forces the voter to indicate equal liking for all voted for rather  
than permitting the voter to indicate the difference in liking and,  
hopefully, electing one of the better-liked candidates.  This is what  
leads many of us to want a better election method.

DWK
>
>
> Therefore your assumption that the Republocrats are all that's  
> viable won't
> hold up long in Approval. That mis-assumption can only be preserved  
> by means
> of Plurality voting.
>
> People want something better. Believing that only the Republocrats are
> viable, people convince themselves that somehow the Republocrats  
> will be
> what the voter wants them to be--because it's believed that they're  
> the only
> game in town. The need to believe is amazingly strong. The suckers  
> will keep
> coming back for more, when their Democrat tells them that he's in  
> favor of
> "change", and that's he's dedicated to helping them. The suckers  
> need to
> believe.
>
> With Approval, it will immediately be apparent that people want more  
> than
> what the Republocrats have proven to be. The "problem" that you  
> speak of, in
> which people have the preferences Green>Democrat>Republican will  
> vanish when
> it becomes obvious that he Republocrats aren't as popular as the  
> media have
> been claiming. The Republican threat will no longer be taken  
> seriously, and
> the idea of a need to support  the nearly-identical Democrat, to  
> protect
> from the Republican, will be seen as hilarious.
>
>>> Don't Democrat and Republican candidates continually offer "change"?
>>> :-) They promise those things because they know that the public want
>>> those things.  But the public will now notice that they don't offer
>>> squat, in regards to those things.
>>
>> This is a problem of all political systems, also when there are  
>> multiple
> parties.
>> The problem may be one step worse in a two-party system where these  
>> two
>> parties are almost guaranteed to return back to power soon,  
>> whatever they
> do.
>
> You catch on fast. The problem is that, since people believe that  
> only Dem
> can beat Repub, they're going to vote for the Dem no matter what,  
> and the
> Dems know that, and so they know that they don't have to be less  
> corrupt
> than the Repubs. They don't even have to keep their own promises.  
> You should
> have seen and heard Bill Clinton trying to keep from laughing, when  
> he told
> us that he realized that he wouldn't be able to keep his middle-class
> tax-break campaign promise.
>
> We had a congressional candidate who emotionally spoke against  
> NAFTA, and
> campaigned in an anti-NAFTA T-shirt. But when he won and got to  
> Washington,
> he immediately became pro-NAFTA.
>
> And no, that isn't a problem of all political systems. It's a  
> problem where
> people believe that there is no alternative to "the two choices".
>
> Mike Ossipoff