[EM] To Condorcetists:

[Juho Laatu]

On 20.5.2012, at 1.00, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> One: No one knows for sure exactly what way of voting (by hir and some hypothetical same-preferring and same-voting faction) will give the best outcome.
> ……….That’s true in Condorcet as well as in Approval.

In Condorcet one can sincerely recommend sincerity. In theory there are cases where one could cheat the system. But in practice sincerity is by far the best strategy that voters have in large elections where voters make independent decisions. The challenge is to find practical situations where regular voters, after hearing some poll results (and possibly some poll based situation specific strategic advices by the media), would have good reason to vote otherwise (in a way that they can master an that is likely to improve the outcome). If for these reasons strategy free voting becomes widely accepted, and a norm, we have a system that may serve the society well.

> Two: In Approval, if you like strategy, I’ve given simple instructions for determining the way of voting that maximizes your expectation. I’ve described it for u/a elections,
> ………..and for non-u/a elections.

I'd be interested in the one (or ones) that the regular voters are supposed to follow in real life Approvan elections. That one determines how well Approval will work (after taking into account any additional facts like e.g. some tendency to bullet vote and possible situation specific strategic guidance).

You mentioned also sincere approval of "approvable" canddates as a strategy that could be recommended to the voters. Do you think Approval can handle well situations where some voters or voter groups are strategic while some are sincere?

> Three:  In Condorcet, you don’t have a known strategy for maximizing expectation. In a u/a election you have, instead, a ridiculous dilemma, and no hint of what will maximize
> …………..your expectation. In fact, in general, expectation-maximizing strategy is not available in Condorcet.

In Condorcet sincere voting approximates "maximization of expectation" pretty well. In Approval I'm waiting for your description on how to do that, i.e. some words of guidance to regular voters on how to vote.

Juho



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