[EM] To Condorcetists:

Michael Ossipoff email9648742 at gmail.com
Sat May 19 15:00:37 PDT 2012


Juho:

 

You asked if I'd answer questions that you say remain unanswered. Of course.
I answer all questions. If there's a question that I haven't answered, then
let me know.

 

But please be specific. 

 

You said:

 

My opinion is that the biggest problem of Approval is the difficulty of
voters to find a working strategy when there are more than two poential
winners 

 

[endquote]

 

You see, that is why I say that you haven't been reading my postings, and
haven't read my article.

 

My article described a number of easy and simple strategies for Approval,
for those who want strategy. 

 

But I emphasized that my first recommendation is to just vote for candidates
that you like, trust, or who deserve your support. That isn't has hard as
you seem to think. It's usually pretty obvious which candidates qualify.

 

And I've discussed this more in my most recent postings here at EM:

 

One: No one knows for sure exactly what way of voting (by hir and some
hypothetical same-preferring and same-voting faction) will give the best
outcome.

....That's true in Condorcet as well as in Approval.

 

Two: In Approval, if you like strategy, I've given simple instructions for
determining the way of voting that maximizes your expectation. I've
described it for u/a elections,

.....and for non-u/a elections.

 

Three:  In Condorcet, you don't have a known strategy for maximizing
expectation. In a u/a election you have, instead, a ridiculous dilemma, and
no hint of what will maximize

......your expectation. In fact, in general, expectation-maximizing strategy
is not available in Condorcet.

 

I'll reply to the rest of your recent postings within a few days.

 

Mike Ossipoff

 

 

 

 

 

 

(e.g. when there are two candidates from one wing and one from the other).
Also Plurality has related problems with strategy, but in Plurality (in a
two-party system) a good strategy is to vote for one of the two dominant
parties. In Approval the voter may not have any such safe strategy option.

 

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