[EM] To Condorcetists:

[Juho Laatu]

On 20.5.2012, at 1.00, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> You asked if I’d answer questions that you say remain unanswered. Of course. I answer all questions. If there’s a question that I haven’t answered, then let me know.
>  
> But please be specific.

Maybe the number one on the list of the still unanswered questions is the following one.


[example+question starts here]

26: A > B >> C
26: B > A >> C
24: C >> A > B
24: C >> B > A
- A and B are Democrats and C is a Republican

How should voters vote after seeing these (quite reliable) poll results if they follow the "better than expectation" strategy? Should A and B be seen as the expected winners with 50% winning chance both? Maybe 50% of the voters should guess that A wins and 50% that B wins (?).

[example+question ends here]


A good answer to this question would solve many of the Approval strategy related open questions. (Working Condorcet strategies still to be covered.)

What should an individual regular voter do in the given situation? How do they identify their best strategic vote?

That situation is quite common, except that accurate ties in polls are not common. In practice that could mean one poll saying that A leads B by 0.5% and another one saying that B leads A by 0.4%. Anyway, the difference between A and B falls within the error margin and expected amount of changes in opinions before the election day, and people are uncertain of which one of A and B will be more popular. If you want, you may assume that C is not likely to reach 50% first preference support.

Juho




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