[EM] Approval-Fill-In--Always an improvement, and an option in Approval.

[Michael Ossipoff]

Chris--

I'm referring to the procedure that you suggested: When the wiinnner by
some method is determined, then each
ballot gives an approval to that winner, and also to every candidate whom
it ranks higher.

You haven't named that procedure yet, and so, until you do, I'm calling it
"Approval-Fill-In".

Three things occur to me about Approval-Fill-In:

1. It would improve on any and every method. From the point of view of each
voter, it is an improvement,
because every voter would want to help, against that winner, the candidates
whom s/he likes better.

It would elect someone more liked. It would improve social utility (SU).

2. There's no reason for it to only use one rank-count, or, in general, one
method. Each voter could
designate any method that the (presumably secure) count procedures are set
up for, and use it for
hir Approval-Fill-In. Different voters may have different ideas of which
method best chooses the CW,
their least-liked candidate to optimally approve..

3. In fact, Approval-Fill-In, based on a rank-count could be an _option_
for an Approval election.

There's no reason to not allow any voter, in an Approval election, to
choose her approvals in any way
that s/he wants to. They're hir approvals, after all.

All of the Approval election approval-management options that I've
described could be offered, and
so could Approval-Fill-In, based on the rank-count of the voter's own
choice.

As I've often pointed out, an option is incomparably more proposable than a
new voting system.
People could argue the fairness, rightness or results of a new voting
system, and it could take
forever to get it enacted, if ever. But, since each voter's vote is hir
own, to do with as s/he pleases,
no one can object to an option. (Though I'd oppose one if it violated FBC).

I consider ICT to be the best rank count, and the best way to try to choose
the CW. It doesn't meet
Condorcet's Criteriion, but it encourages sincerity in ways that Condorcet
does not, and is free of
Condorcet's sinceriy-discouragements.

So, though I've suggested a large set of approval-management options,
including MCA, MTA,  ABucklin,
MTA2, MTA/MCA, ABucklin2, and conditional versions of all of those--I
considerICT to be better than
those, at least partly because of its somewhat better defection-resistance.

So my first suggestion for an approval-management option would be
Approval-Fill-In. My suggested method
for a voter to designate for hir Approval-Fill-In would be iCT.

I suggest that the best route to enactment of a good rank method would be
Approval. I've spoken of how
Approval is nothing other than an elimination of Plurality's ridiculous
forced falsification requirement. And
I've mentioned how therefore Approval is the only method that would
obviously be an improvement over
Plurality, and only an improvement.

And, as I said above, no one can object to the fairness of an _option_.
And the Approval-Fill-In option could
use any method as its basis.

This approach would be the best for the person who is reluctant to replace
Plurality, since it merely proposes
the method that can only improve on Plurality. The minimal correction of
Plurlity's ridiculous problem.

It would also be best for the advocate of any rank count, because
it can lead (as an approval-management option) to something demonstrably
better than that rank count
(that rank count with Approval-Fill-In).

Mike Ossipoff
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