# [EM] Sainte-Lague vs d'Hondt for party list PR

Juho Laatu juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk
Sat Jul 14 19:09:55 PDT 2012

```Also this mail may not have much new content to others than Mike Ossipoff and me.

On 15.7.2012, at 2.30, Michael Ossipoff wrote:

> On Fri, Jul 13, 2012 at 3:39 AM, Juho Laatu <juho4880 at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> I think you are making the question quite complex and quite detailed.
>
> Speaking detailedly and specifically is necessary. You're saying that
> you want to ignore details.

I don't want to say that.

> That won't do.
>
> You said:
>
> I also don't know if this is a reply to something specific that I
> said or just general observations on what kind of systems I might
> like.
>
> [endquote]
>
> It's both. It's based on what you said about what your goal is.
>
> You said:
>
>>
>> One basic approach that I find quite decent is the idea that if one wants to have accurate proportional representation, then n% of the votes should lead to approximately n% of the seats.
>
> [endquote]
>
> I showed in my previous post that, if you want n% of the votes to get
> n% of the seats, that an only be achieved by making the parties' s/q
> equal.

Yes, in the ideal case. Alternatively you could talk about the number of Hare quotas.

>
>
> You said:
>
> That in a way says something about the roots of the idea of
> proportional representation.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Yes.
>
>
>
> Is this a helpful definition of my rough approach or should I say
> something more?
>
> [endquote]
>
> Yes, that's a sufficient definition of your approach. No, you've fully
> specified it and no more description is needed.
>
> And your goal is another way of saying that you want the s/q to be
> equal. That's what SL does.

SL tries to approximate the ideal s/q in one way.

> It puts each party's s/q as close as
> possible to the ideal equal value of s/q.

Using one specific algorithm / measure to do that.

Juho

>
>
> Below is where Juho quoted one of my arguments.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>>
>> Juho
>>
>>
>> On 13.7.2012, at 2.50, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
>>
>>> Juho:
>>>
>>> Let me put it this way:
>>>
>>> You like the Hare quota, calculated based on the preferred house-size.
>>> Total votes divided by the preferred total number of seats.
>>>
>>> If you like the Hare quota, then would you object to putting each
>>> party's seats as close as possible to its number of Hare quotas?
>>>
>>> If you object to that, then please tell why.
>>>
>>> If you don't object to it:
>>>
>>> Remember that that Hare quota was based on a preferred (but ultimately
>>> not required) total number of seats for the parliament. Do you think
>>> that if we had "preferred" a different number of seats, that would
>>> somehow be less fair? ...that the resulting allocation would be less
>>> fair?
>>>
>>> If not, then you agree that the Hare quota isn't privileged as a divisor.
>>>
>>> So, if you liked putting the parties' seats as close as possible to
>>> their Hare quotas, the result of dividing their votes by the Hare
>>> quota, then how could you not like, just as much, putting the parties'
>>> seats as close as possible to the result of dividing their seats by
>>> some other divisor? (We could call that other divisor the Hare quota,
>>> based on some different preferred (but not required) house-size)
>>>
>>> Mike Ossipoff
>>> .
>>> ----
>>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

```