[EM] Kevin: Majority Judgement

[Jameson Quinn]

2012/1/30 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>

>
> Hi Kevin--
>
> You wrote:
>
> In my simulations MJ and Bucklinesque methods usually show similar strategy patterns to Approval. (Though so
> does Range.)
>
> [endquote]
>
> Yes. And so there's no justification for MJ's greater elaborateness, if it doesn't get get rid of strategies
> possessed by much simpler methods.
>
>
Better expressivity than approval, which allows a naive voter to vote with
less strategic-style thinking.

Less strategic impulse than Range.

Shares the rated advantages - including IIA, etc.

These are the justifications.


> The conditional methods, offerable as voting-options in Approval election, do much to alleviate the
>
> problem of help for a lower choice hurting your favorite.
>
> You wrote:
>
> If you go lower in the rankings (e.g. consider safety of 2nd preference from the specified 3rd preference) I think
> the numbers just get more and more unclear as to whether you stand to gain anything for the risk you definitely
> take.
>
> [endquote]
>
> Yes, things get more doubtful and uncertain lower in a ranking.
>
> For one thing, in a 3-slot method, if you're a progressive, then you might feel safe in the belief that no progressive will
>
> middle-rate a Republican, though many might (at first) middle-rate one or more Democrats. You might also feel safe in assuming
> that Democrat top-raters won't middle rate Republicans. They consider the Republicans to the main thing they need to defeat.
>
> (Sure, the Democrat and Republican candidates are really so policy-identical that one would expect a top-rater of one to like
> the other too, but I feel that most or all Democrat voters don't really like the Democrat policies best. I believe that most or
>
> all Democrat voters are really progressives who feel that they need to strategically give it to the Democrats)
>
> Knowing those things in a 3-slot election gives some sureness to the protection and enforcement of majority rule.
>
> In ABucklin, with unlimited rank positions, at lower rank positions, you can't really expect to guess reliably at what
> point a group of voters will refuse to rank less-liked candidates, and so you don't have the assurances that
>
> you'd have in a 3-slot method. Not unless there is some explicit organizing for co-operation among factions.
>
> For that reason, I said earlier that I'd only advocate AOCBucklin if AERLO is available.
>
>
> So, now that I won't propose AERLO, then I probably won't propose AOCBucklin (or ABucklin or Bucklin either, of course) either.
>
> Mike Ossipoff
>
>
>
> By the way, I agree that AERLO methods probably violate FBC. The effects are too unpredictable.
>
>
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>
>
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