[EM] TTPBA//TR is innocent. Electing A is controversial.

MIKE OSSIPOFF nkklrp at hotmail.com
Wed Jan 18 13:24:17 PST 2012

TTPBA//TR is innocent:

TTPBA//TR, which I call ICT, is innocent of most of the charges that I made yesterday.

My posting making those charges was based on treating ICT as if it said "tied" instead of "tied at top".

1. It's true that ICT doesn't elect A in the ABE. It elects C, in compliance with the Plurality Criterion.

I emphasize that I would have no objection to the election of A, which confers some strategy benefit.
(As for objections to electing A, I'll address those later in this posting.

2. Because it's "tied at top", instead of "tied", ICT doesn't elect C in Kevin's MMPO bad-example.

3. ITC has successful burial strategy. But yes, that's greatly mitigated by the fact that that strategy is only
usable for the most favorite candidate.

Electing A in the ABE is controversial:

Certainly it's controversial on EM. And maybe similar controversy could be stirred up by opponents
of an MMPO enaction proposal, in an enaction campaign.

Sure, Jameson, the A voters might really be indifferent between B and C. They might be using
burial strategy against C, by insincerely voting B over C.

Sincere rankings:

27: A
24: B
49: C

Everyone is indifferent between the candidates other than their favorite.

First, I emphasize that the conditional methods elect C in the ABE. 

(In the _optional_ conditional methods, of course C, instead of B, is elected
only if enough A voters have made their B middle rating

I acknowledge that strategy problem. The C voters could defend by burying the non-C candidate
able to benefit from burying C. That would be A. But I, too, don't like anyone to have to use
defensive burying strategy, even though favorite-burial isn't needed.

Of course one should consider disadvantages in comparison to advantages.

How bad is that burying problem? In the sincere plumping example above, the burial strategy
is used among 3 disunited non-majority factions. The important thing is protection of majority
rule. Majority rule doesn't apply in the above example. 

If there's a majority voting B over C, then there's nothing that the C voters can do about
that. All they can do is use insincere burial to choose which of {A,B} will win. 

How bad is that, that a losing faction can at least choose which candidate of the {A,B}
majority faction will win?

If someone brings up a scenario where the buryers' insincere pairwise votes combine with
sincere ones by the majority members among eachother's candidates, to defeat the majority 
candidates, then, even if that could pose a problem, the majority voters could avoid it 
by top-rating the same set of candidates, or by protecting them with AERLo.

An advantage of electing A?  My poll ballot shows one. Among the CD-complying rank-counts
that don't let voters designate conditionality, the ones that elect A instead of C in the
ABE don't strategically deter the use of AERLO.

Mike Ossipoff


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