[EM] AERLO in conditional voting. Speculations.
nkklrp at hotmail.com
Tue Jan 10 10:37:00 PST 2012
I want to emphasize the distinction between speculations and proposals.
AOC, MTAOC, MCAOC, AOCBucklin, and their automatic (non-optional)-conditionality versions
AC, MTAC, MCAC and ACBucklin are proposals, not speculations.
I prefer the optional-conditionality versions to the automatic-conditionality versions.
Because the conditional voting methods are offered as optional, offering those ways of using one's
Approval vote as voting options in the Approval election doesn't wrong anyone who doesn't choose
to use them.
I sometimes mention speculations too. I'll mention a few at the end of this post.
AERLO in conditional voting:
1. Obviously, if you want your middle rating for a candidate to be conditional, then you certainly wouldn't
want to give hir unconditional AERLO status. So, plainly, if a ballot marks an above-AERLO candidate
as "(conditional)", the AERLO status should only apply if the candidate qualifies for receiving your
conditional middle rating.
2. I suggested that the default assumption for designation of coalition-suitable candidates should
be "Above AERLO (or top-rated or top-ranked if the ballot doesn't use AERLO)".
But, for use in conditional voting, I suggest, for that default assumption, two additional requirements
for a coalition-suitable candidate:
a) must not be a conditionally-rated candidate
b) must be ranked over the candidate being considered for actually receiving the conditional vote listed
for hir on the ballot.
I mentioned that, in MTA or MCA, when AERLO is used, a ballot's middle-rated candidates could be
listed vertically, as a ranking, for AERLO purposes, even though they're all middle-rated. That
qualifies as the ranking referred to in b).
3. Though I wouldn't unilaterally suggest it, AERLO could fairly be automatic at the bottom of any
ranking that doesn't choose AERLO.
After all, you like all of your ranked candidates better than any of your unranked ones. So, in the event
that none of your ranked candidates wins, it could only be beneficial to you to move them all up to
1st place, for a 2nd count. That could only be beneficial.
Still, it amounts to changing someone's ranking without their permission. Based on that principle,
and wanting to offer AERLO as an _option_, my inclination is to not make AERLO automatic
at the end of ballots that don't specify use of AERLO. If others advocated that, then sure. But
I wouldn't unilaterally suggest any automatic, non-optional application of AERLO, or any
other non-optional modifications of a voted ballot.
A speculation, regarding #1, above:
Maybe, for top rating, there could and should be a stronger mutuality requirement, a top-mutuality
requirement, before moving the conditional, but above-AERLO, candidate to top, but I haven't
looked at if, or how, that could work. It's a speculation. I emphasize that I don't suggest that complication for the
poll. And, for public proposals, that would be a _later_ proposal. If such a requirement were workable
and desirable, it could be implemented exactly as conditional middle ratings are dealt with in MTAOC.
Some FBC/ABE Condorcet-like rank method speculations:
I mentioned that maybe Condorcet could be modified for FBC/ABE methods. Before that, of course Kevin's
tied-at-top pairwise comparisons had been suggested for use in such methods.
Yesterday I suggested MMPO, but with an initial disqualification of Condorcet losers. But that wouldn't avoid
Kevin's bad-example, because we could add a Candidate D, whom no one ranks. C pairwise pair-beats hir, and
so isn't Condorcet loser.
Maybe Condorcet (Tied-At-Top), MMPO2 is more promising. I don't know if it would have the desired
properties. It's only a speculation at this point.
Other such speculations:
1. MinMax Tied-at-Top pairwise defeat? A Tied-at-Top counterpart to MMPO.
Of course I mean that its pairwise comparisons would be Kevin's tied-at-top pairwise comparisons.
2. Greatest Tied-at-Top pairwise win?
3. Condorcet(Tied-at-Top), Top. Among the candidates who don't have a tied-at-top pairwise defeat, elect the one
who has the most top ratings.
I haven't examined those speculations.
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