[EM] Brief Comment on IRV debate

[David L Wetzell]

>
>
> Subject: [EM] Brief comment about IRV discussion
> MO:The discussion about IRV referred to something like P(IRV) and
> P(other), where those presumably represent the probability of
> success of IRV vs that of other methods.
>
> Burlington should show you that the probability of IRV ever making it to
> federal use is zero. I mean, can you be serious? Any proposal
> for federal elections would be thoroughly scrutinized and examined. Do you
> think that Burlington's demonstration of IRV's spoiler
> problem won't be found by those studying IRV's merit?
>

dlw: You gotta find new material.  It's called the problem of
micronumerosity.  Burlington VT is not the smoking gun.  It's evidence that
if we get perfectionistic so the anti-reform types can play divide and
conquer agianst us that they can barely repeal IRV before it gets traction.


Like I wrote, the only way a non-CW can win w. IRV is if the two biggest
parties do not center themselves around the center.  This possibility is
what will goad them to recenter themselves more often.  That is what would
have happened in Burlington if the anti-IRV campaign had not succeeded.

>
> Over the decades, when confronted with IRV's spoiler problem, the IRV
> promoters always insisted that it's just "theoretical".
>

I believe non-monotonicity is theoretical, because it presumes that a
significant fraction of the population has a total change of heart as to
who to vote for.  It doesn't have the Weak Condorcet Winner problem, which
means the CW doesn't always win and when that happens, it can get spun to
bring back a more illiberal election rule.

>
>  if complete results were
> always available from IRV elections, the spoiler problem would be found to
> happen in other instances as well.
>

The issue is how much and how bad is the numero dos candidate relative to
the CW.  The Vermont Prog candidate wasn't that far off from the center...

>
> (We should be contacting IRV opposition in the cities using it or
> considering it, to suggest that they insist that complete
> election results be divulged after IRV elections. Maybe letters to the
> editor to papers in those cities too.)
>
> Though I've heard some IRV-promoter rhetoric about it, I haven't heard an
> IRV-promoter's explanation for how that "theoretical"
> problem actually happened, and an explanation for how he can still claim
> that IRV's spoiler problem is only theoretical.
>

You have to sort thru what's being discussed.  Nonmonotonicity is
theoretical, as in sour grapes "if only if..."   As for "spoiling", IRV
reduces its likelihood of happening.  It can only happen if there are three
relatively big parties and the two biggest are not centered around the
center and the supporters of the party-off center don't read the writing on
the wall and strategically support the more centrist party.

>
> JQ:It's obvious that Burlington was a serious failure for IRV. It did not
> live up to the advantages promoters had claimed for it.


 dlw: Their simplified marketing pitch wisely did not go into these sort of
relatively unlikely outcomes and they froze the message to being about IRV
vs a return to the status quo, as is also wise in an election campaign, as
opposed to an electoral methods listserve.

>
> JQ: However, I have heard IRV supporters claim that Burlington was not a
> total failure, because the results were better than plurality, assuming
> that same set of (presumably mostly honest) ballots. I've also heard them
> claim that Approval would have gotten the same results as plurality, due to
> (my words) the Chicken dilemma. I disagree with both of these ideas, but I
> can't trivially refute them.
>
> That said, I agree that it's hard to imagine voters going for IRV
> nationally after Burlington. Even the arguments above amount to "it wasn't
> TOO bad", which is not exactly inspiring.
>

I've no doubt that Burlington wd continue to get spun against IRV.  The
point is the dynamics.  Instead of two major parties tilting too far off
center, as has been the case, we'd have two major parties that'd need to
adjust to the moving center far more often.

But it's inane to think that a particular third party is going to be able
to get as strong as the Prog party of VT in Burlington at the Nat'l level
w.o. getting coopted by the major parties, jealous to keep their duopoly
positions.  So the chances of this happening are nil in prez elections.

The problem with IRV in such elections wd be vote-counting and that is
fixed by IRV3/AV3....

>
> Honestly, this is part of why I keep pushing SODA. I think that incumbents
> are used to balancing the dynamic tension of playing to their base or
> playing to the center. I think that a system which radically upsets that
> balance in favor of centrists is very scary to them, as well as to partisan
> activists. I think that Condorcet actually does upset the balance in this
> way; and that  Range and Approval arguably do, at least enough to wake
> those fears. I think that this fear has various facets; it's the real
> "meat" behind the LNH argument, and I've also talked about it as the "weak
> CW problem". It's perfectly reasonable not to want a dark-horse CW to win
> if they couldn't in fact survive the scrutiny of a runoff; and even if it
> weren't reasonable, any incumbent would hate having to worry about that
> happening.
>
> Anyway, that whole argument leaves just IRV, MJ, and SODA as viable. IRV,
> I agree, is a dead end, with numerous serious problems. So the question for
> me is, is MJ or SODA more likely to pass in the US? Right now, I believe
> that the answer is SODA, but I'm not really sure.
>

dlw: What about IRV3/AV3?  Like I said above, it's not easy for a third
party to get as strong as VT Prog was in Burlington at the state or nat'l
level... and the dynamics wd be towards a change in the nature of the two
major parties more so than the continuation of a competitive 3-way
election....

>
> (Again, I will strongly support Approval, Range, or Condorcet. I'm not
> saying this argument makes them bad. I'm saying it makes them less viable
> because incumbents and partisans, probably the two most-politically-active
> groups there are, would both be very wary of them for these reasons.)
>

It's nice to see a little more realism on the list-serve.

dlw

>
> Jameson
>
>
>
> 2012/1/20 MIKE OSSIPOFF <nkklrp at hotmail.com>
>
>>  The discussion about IRV referred to something like P(IRV) and P(other),
>> where those presumably represent the probability of
>> success of IRV vs that of other methods.
>>
>> Burlington should show you that the probability of IRV ever making it to
>> federal use is zero. I mean, can you be serious? Any proposal
>> for federal elections would be thoroughly scrutinized and examined. Do
>> you think that Burlington's demonstration of IRV's spoiler
>> problem won't be found by those studying IRV's merit?
>>
>> Over the decades, when confronted with IRV's spoiler problem, the IRV
>> promoters always insisted that it's just "theoretical".
>>
>> But now it can no longer be said to be only theoretical, because it has
>> happened. In fact, most likely, if complete results were
>> always available from IRV elections, the spoiler problem would be found
>> to happen in other instances as well.
>>
>> (We should be contacting IRV opposition in the cities using it or
>> considering it, to suggest that they insist that complete
>> election results be divulged after IRV elections. Maybe letters to the
>> editor to papers in those cities too.)
>>
>> Though I've heard some IRV-promoter rhetoric about it, I haven't heard an
>> IRV-promoter's explanation for how that "theoretical"
>> problem actually happened, and an explanation for how he can still claim
>> that IRV's spoiler problem is only theoretical.
>>
>> David was using "x" to mean "merit" or something like that, when he spoke
>> of x(IRV). Regarding IRV's merit, see above.
>>
>> Mike Ossipoff
>>
>>
>> ----
>> Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
>> info
>>
>>
>
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