<div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><br>Subject: [EM] Brief comment about IRV discussion<br>
<div><div dir="ltr">MO:The discussion about IRV referred to something like P(IRV) and P(other), where those presumably represent the probability of<br>success of IRV vs that of other methods.<br><br>Burlington should show you that the probability of IRV ever making it to federal use is zero. I mean, can you be serious? Any proposal<br>
for federal elections would be thoroughly scrutinized and examined. Do you think that Burlington's demonstration of IRV's spoiler<br>problem won't be found by those studying IRV's merit?<br></div></div></blockquote>
<div><br></div><div>dlw: You gotta find new material. It's called the problem of micronumerosity. Burlington VT is not the smoking gun. It's evidence that if we get perfectionistic so the anti-reform types can play divide and conquer agianst us that they can barely repeal IRV before it gets traction. </div>
<div><br></div><div>Like I wrote, the only way a non-CW can win w. IRV is if the two biggest parties do not center themselves around the center. This possibility is what will goad them to recenter themselves more often. That is what would have happened in Burlington if the anti-IRV campaign had not succeeded. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div dir="ltr"><br>Over the decades, when confronted with IRV's spoiler problem, the IRV promoters always insisted that it's just "theoretical".<br>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I believe non-monotonicity is theoretical, because it presumes that a significant fraction of the population has a total change of heart as to who to vote for. It doesn't have the Weak Condorcet Winner problem, which means the CW doesn't always win and when that happens, it can get spun to bring back a more illiberal election rule. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div dir="ltr"><br> if complete results were<br>always available from IRV elections, the spoiler problem would be found to happen in other instances as well. <br>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>The issue is how much and how bad is the numero dos candidate relative to the CW. The Vermont Prog candidate wasn't that far off from the center... </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><div dir="ltr"><br>(We should be contacting IRV opposition in the cities using it or considering it, to suggest that they insist that complete<br>election results be divulged after IRV elections. Maybe letters to the editor to papers in those cities too.)<br>
<br>Though I've heard some IRV-promoter rhetoric about it, I haven't heard an IRV-promoter's explanation for how that "theoretical"<br>problem actually happened, and an explanation for how he can still claim that IRV's spoiler problem is only theoretical.<br>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>You have to sort thru what's being discussed. Nonmonotonicity is theoretical, as in sour grapes "if only if..." As for "spoiling", IRV reduces its likelihood of happening. It can only happen if there are three relatively big parties and the two biggest are not centered around the center and the supporters of the party-off center don't read the writing on the wall and strategically support the more centrist party. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><div dir="ltr"><br></div></div>JQ:It's obvious that Burlington was a serious failure for IRV. It did not live up to the advantages promoters had claimed for it.</blockquote>
<div><br></div><div> dlw: Their simplified marketing pitch wisely did not go into these sort of relatively unlikely outcomes and they froze the message to being about IRV vs a return to the status quo, as is also wise in an election campaign, as opposed to an electoral methods listserve. </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div><br></div><div>JQ: However, I have heard IRV supporters claim that Burlington was not a total failure, because the results were better than plurality, assuming that same set of (presumably mostly honest) ballots. I've also heard them claim that Approval would have gotten the same results as plurality, due to (my words) the Chicken dilemma. I disagree with both of these ideas, but I can't trivially refute them.</div>
<div><br></div><div>That said, I agree that it's hard to imagine voters going for IRV nationally after Burlington. Even the arguments above amount to "it wasn't TOO bad", which is not exactly inspiring.</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>I've no doubt that Burlington wd continue to get spun against IRV. The point is the dynamics. Instead of two major parties tilting too far off center, as has been the case, we'd have two major parties that'd need to adjust to the moving center far more often. </div>
<div><br></div><div>But it's inane to think that a particular third party is going to be able to get as strong as the Prog party of VT in Burlington at the Nat'l level w.o. getting coopted by the major parties, jealous to keep their duopoly positions. So the chances of this happening are nil in prez elections. </div>
<div><br></div><div>The problem with IRV in such elections wd be vote-counting and that is fixed by IRV3/AV3....</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><br></div><div>Honestly, this is part of why I keep pushing SODA. I think that incumbents are used to balancing the dynamic tension of playing to their base or playing to the center. I think that a system which radically upsets that balance in favor of centrists is very scary to them, as well as to partisan activists. I think that Condorcet actually does upset the balance in this way; and that Range and Approval arguably do, at least enough to wake those fears. I think that this fear has various facets; it's the real "meat" behind the LNH argument, and I've also talked about it as the "weak CW problem". It's perfectly reasonable not to want a dark-horse CW to win if they couldn't in fact survive the scrutiny of a runoff; and even if it weren't reasonable, any incumbent would hate having to worry about that happening.</div>
<div><br></div><div>Anyway, that whole argument leaves just IRV, MJ, and SODA as viable. IRV, I agree, is a dead end, with numerous serious problems. So the question for me is, is MJ or SODA more likely to pass in the US? Right now, I believe that the answer is SODA, but I'm not really sure.</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>dlw: What about IRV3/AV3? Like I said above, it's not easy for a third party to get as strong as VT Prog was in Burlington at the state or nat'l level... and the dynamics wd be towards a change in the nature of the two major parties more so than the continuation of a competitive 3-way election.... </div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><br></div><div>(Again, I will strongly support Approval, Range, or Condorcet. I'm not saying this argument makes them bad. I'm saying it makes them less viable because incumbents and partisans, probably the two most-politically-active groups there are, would both be very wary of them for these reasons.)</div>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>It's nice to see a little more realism on the list-serve.</div><div><br></div><div>dlw </div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><br></div><div>Jameson</div><div><br></div><div><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">2012/1/20 MIKE OSSIPOFF <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:nkklrp@hotmail.com" target="_blank">nkklrp@hotmail.com</a>></span><br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div><div dir="ltr">
The discussion about IRV referred to something like P(IRV) and P(other), where those presumably represent the probability of<br>success of IRV vs that of other methods.<br><br>Burlington should show you that the probability of IRV ever making it to federal use is zero. I mean, can you be serious? Any proposal<br>
for federal elections would be thoroughly scrutinized and examined. Do you think that Burlington's demonstration of IRV's spoiler<br>problem won't be found by those studying IRV's merit?<br><br>Over the decades, when confronted with IRV's spoiler problem, the IRV promoters always insisted that it's just "theoretical".<br>
<br>But now it can no longer be said to be only theoretical, because it has happened. In fact, most likely, if complete results were<br>always available from IRV elections, the spoiler problem would be found to happen in other instances as well. <br>
<br>(We should be contacting IRV opposition in the cities using it or considering it, to suggest that they insist that complete<br>election results be divulged after IRV elections. Maybe letters to the editor to papers in those cities too.)<br>
<br>Though I've heard some IRV-promoter rhetoric about it, I haven't heard an IRV-promoter's explanation for how that "theoretical"<br>problem actually happened, and an explanation for how he can still claim that IRV's spoiler problem is only theoretical.<br>
<br>David was using "x" to mean "merit" or something like that, when he spoke of x(IRV). Regarding IRV's merit, see above.<span><font color="#888888"><br><br>Mike Ossipoff<br><br> </font></span></div>
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