[EM] Kevin V, Richard F., Raph F

Tue Feb 21 00:48:09 PST 2012

Hi David,

>________________________________
> De : David L Wetzell <wetzelld at gmail.com>
>À : election-methods at lists.electorama.com 
>Envoyé le : Lundi 20 février 2012 13h18
>Objet : Re: [EM] Kevin V, Richard F., Raph F
> 
>
>
>>From: Kevin Venzke <stepjak at yahoo.fr>
>>To: election-methods <election-methods at electorama.com>
>>Cc: 
>>Date: Mon, 20 Feb 2012 03:01:06 +0000 (GMT)
>>Subject: Re: [EM] Kevin V.
>>Hi David,
>>
>>>>KV:The similarity is that with SODA, you (and like-minded candidates) get a benefit even if you don't
>>>>win. Under normal methods you have the inherent pressure against running clones (that I think we both
>>>>agree exists) with little possible benefit in nominating them.
>>>
>>>dlw: What is the benefit?  You might get lucky?  There'd be pressure in real life against clones running
>>>regardless and so the strength of the effect is still an empirical question.  
>> 
>>The benefits are
>>1. to the candidate: still gets to influence the result even if he loses
>>2. to the voter: greater chance of having somebody palatable to vote for without wasting the vote
>>3. to the candidate's party: the candidate can attract voters that might not have bothered voting if there
>>had only been one nominee.
>>
>
>
>dlw: If it's really a clone then 2 seem like a stretch.   For 1 and 3, why not just hire more campaign staff to GOTV?  
>
>They're clones in the sense that they come from the same party and are expected to transfer votes to each other
once they lose.

I don't understand how you're responding to 1. That point is saying that even if I only get 5% of the vote I still
have some influence in who will win.

Regarding 3: This is related to 2. If the voter likes Cain and hates Gingrich you can't simply hire more staff to make 

him like Gingrich instead.

>
> 
>>The main factor working against nominating clones in most methods is that it risks dividing up the voters
>>such that they refuse to vote for all the like-minded candidates. If voters actually delegate power to a candidate
>>(which is a little uncertain) the risk of this is reduced.
>>
>
>
>dlw: It also imposes higher costs on voters in terms of getting to know the candidates and figuring out that so-and-so are clones... 
>
>Yes, under most methods it does, because the voters would have to list all the clones for it to count.

>
> 
>>>>By "difficult to tabulate" I was talking about IRV itself. But no matter:
>>>
>>>dlw: Maybe that's why I'm pushing IRV+???
>> 
>>Ok, maybe I should take that literally, that you want to use an approval filter because it makes IRV easier
>>to tabulate. I don't know what else the lack of example scenarios could mean.
>>
>
>
>My motivation is pragmatic, or problem-solving driven, rather than based on stylized hypotheticals.. 
>
>Ok. In reference to the approval component I can believe that.

>
>
>>>>KV:Ok, so you are married to IRV or variants because of its "first mover" status. Then my question switches
>>>>to how the approval rule helps it. Do you have a scenario on-hand that shows your method doing something
>>>>preferable to what IRV normally would do? I can't think of what the expected difference would be, except
>>>>when somehow the second-place (on first preferences) candidate isn't among the top three approved. Are
>>>>you thinking of a Chirac/Jospin/Le Pen scenario (2002 French presidential election)? Though that would
>>>>not even have happened under IRV.
>>>
>>>dlw: Speeding up the election and simplifying the use of IRV are enuf to justify the use of IRV+ over IRV,
>>>especially for bigger elections.  It doesn't matter how often it'd get a different outcome.  There'd be no recursion
>>>in the explanation of how it'd work and that'd be one less arg that opponents of electoral reform could use
>>>against it.  
>>>Plus, almost all of the args used by advocates of Approval Voting against IRV would get watered down...,
>>>cuz the simple fact of the matter is that IRV works best with only 3 candidates.  
>>
>>I don't buy that second paragraph at all. Contrived IRV bad examples usually don't need more than three.
>>Do you know one that requires four?
>>
>
>
>dlw: Well, it's the least important for me personally of the args, hence why it's listed last.
>It's easiest to give bad egs with 3 candidates.  That doesn't mean they don't also exist for more than 3.  
>
>If you know of examples where order of elimination matters in a cascading fashion then that'd make a great example for IRV+.   
>As for IRV working best with only 3 candidates, the pathological examples emerge only in the relatively rare case of competitive 3 way elections
>and those are relatively rare and not stable so the use of less ranking info by IRV relative to Condorcet methods would be less important w. only 3 candidates and so on...
>
>Ok.

I'm not too sure what else can be said, if you're mainly trying to simplify a method that you see yourself as forced to pick.

I don't think that any parties so at odds with the Democrats or Republicans
>>that they can't run under those labels, are the parties we are looking for.
>> 
>>I think that if, under whatever rules were in place, there were room for three
>>contenders in an election, you would find not-too-unfamiliar-looking candidates
>>taking the third spot and trying to beat the Ds and Rs. With this situation, it
>>is at least possible that a general viewpoint (about as coherent as those of
>>the Ds and Rs) would come together and allow a third "party" including a label
>>for it.
>>
>
>
>dlw: But most voter perceptions are endogenous or manipulated via the mis-information that is rampant in politics and those who benefit 
>from the current 2-party system own the MSM that is the greatest purveyor of mis-information.  
>
>I don't think I have any ideas for addressing this.

>>It isn't obvious that a three-way race will still fight over the center though.
>>I am interested to study this, but it seems very hard to study voter strategy
>>and nomination strategy at the same time.
>>
>
>
>dlw: This is why I'm diffident over results derived from stylized examples or simulations, like Bayesian Regret.   It's not just a matter of tweaking the parameters, the fundamental design of the election is hard to capture deterministically w.o. lots of ad hoc assumptions.  
>
>It's good to be skeptical of simulations. But they're useful for showing how the world might work given a set of assumptions.

A lot of assumptions aren't quite right but can be accepted to some extent anyway. For instance I typically run elections where 3 candidates
and the voters are dropped randomly on a 1D spectrum. That's not reality, but if a method does badly in that setting, I would still think it's
worth looking into why.

If party discipline were strengthened (though I can't imagine how that would
>>happen) I expect it would force some current Ds and Rs to leave and form new
>>minor parties. But I don't think this in itself would benefit voters much. I
>>think it would mean for many that there is even less of a real choice.
>>
>
>
>If there's no brand-protection via intra-party discipline then many of our perceived choices are not real choices as it is...
>
>There is some "brand-protection" because you can't get the nomination of a party if it doesn't seem that you'll be of any help once elected.

But I prefer not to vote by party label.

Kevin
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